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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL B. McCORVEY, : 
Plaintiff and t 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Case No. 910054 
v. 
* Priority No. 16 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; and LeGRAND : 
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, : 
Defendants and : 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AS 
CROSS-APPELLANT (PART I) and RESPONSE BRIEF OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEE (PART II) 
PART I. REPLY BRIEF 
Cross-appellee McCorvey's brief in response to UDOT's numerous 
legal issues is replete with fabrications and distortions of the 
record evidence. In addition, much of the brief raises material 
irrelevant to the issues in this cross-appeal and appeal.1 UDOT 
*In one inflammatory example, McCorvey singlehandedly accuses, 
tries, and convicts UDOT employee Berry for the death of a young 
woman driving through a chip-resealing zone on 1-70 several days 
after McCorvey's accident (McCorvey Opening Brief at 11 n.5). 
McCorvey does not mention that the witness, David Merchant, also 
said she "was going too fast." Nor does he provide evidence of 
details of that subsequent accident, which merely demonstrate that 
McCorvey was not the only foolish young driver willing to risk life 
and limb by speeding in a construction area with an obviously 
hazardous driving surface: The young woman, driving 80-85 mph, 
came up behind a line of cars travelling in the left lane "at slow 
and prudent speeds." Instead of slowing and following behind, she 
pulled into the right hand lane, lost control, and went down an 
embankment (R. 3004 at 86). UDOT has found no evidence that the 
right lane at that point, although newly chipped, was "unswept." 
refers the Court to its opening brief, which contains record 
citations to support its marshalling of pertinent evidence. The 
following points, however, require a reply and clarification. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Once a case has been heard and tried on a particular theory in 
the trial court, the parties on appeal are restricted to that 
theory. Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 705 (1971) 
(plaintiff/appellant); Hill v. Mayers, 104 Or. App. 629, 802 P.2d 
694, 696 (1990) (plaintiff/appellant); Yellow Cab Co. v. Allen, 377 
P.2d 220 (Okl. 1962) (plaintiff/appellee); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 
Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982) (plaintiff/appellant) . As this 
Court has held, a party may not, for the first time on appeal, 
inject into the case a new theory upon which to predicate 
liability: "Orderly procedure . . . requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or theory of recovery to the 
trial court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter change to 
some different theory[.]" Wagner, 482 P.2d at 705 (quoting Simpson 
v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970)); 
accord Wilson, 656 P.2d at 1033 (theory of negligence per se not 
argued in trial court could not be raised on appeal). 
The bulk of McCorvey's response to UDOT's insufficiency claims 
hinges on his insertion of new theories of UDOT's negligence, other 
than that involving the traffic control plan used on this project, 
that were not presented to the jury for determination. The jury 
was never informed of the vague allegation in his complaint that 
UDOT "and/or LeGrand" had negligently failed to properly pave, 
2 
compact or maintain the surface of 1-15 (Separate Record in C88-
1818 at 0006). In any event, this provision in the complaint 
alleges negligence generally but does not articulate any specific 
theory of negligence* 
McCorvey also never claimed to the jury that UDOT was 
negligent in failing to inspect (or had negligently inspected) the 
contractor's implementation of the traffic control plan on the 
highway or its sweeping of gravel from the chipped and rolled 
lanes. No such negligence claims were ever pleaded against UDOT,2 
and no such claims were argued to the jury for its resolution. 
Furthermore, the jury was never instructed that negligent 
resurfacing of the lanes or negligent inspection of the project 
were alternative theories of McCorvey's negligence case against 
UDOT. In fact, no instruction explained to the jury any theory of 
UDOT's negligence. Instead, the jury was simply told: "Plaintiff 
claims that each of the defendants were [sic] negligent, and the 
negligence of each defendant was a proximate cause of plaintiff [sj 
injuries." (Jury Instruction 20, R. 02546). With regard to UDOT, 
part II of the special verdict form (R. 02522) simply asked the 
jurors: 
2The Governmental Immunity Act retains immunity for injury 
arising "out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(d) (1989). 
3 
(A) Was the State of Utah negligent in one or 
more of the particulars claimed by the 
plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
(B) If 11(A) is "yes", was such negligence a 
proximate cause of the accident? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
In closing argument, the jurors were finally told exactly what 
UDOT had done that was unreasonable. According to McCorvey, this 
accident was caused by a lack of traffic control and would have 
been prevented by closing the outside right lane until after it had 
been swept (R. 3008 at 50). The number one duty here, the duty 
superior to the drivers' duty to use safe speeds, was for the State 
of Utah to have a traffic plan for motorists that told drivers what 
to do and where to go "because we are protecting them from 
themselves and others." (R. 3008 at 54, 56). Because the 
witnesses who had driven the project that day reached different 
conclusions from the traffic control signage about what lane they 
should travel in and what speed they should travel, McCorvey's 
counsel continued, the State and the contractor must have violated 
their "duty to warn of hazards" and the "duty to keep motorists 
travelling that roadway carefully. And ladies and gentlemen, 
that's negligence." (R. 3008 at 60). 
McCorvey's counsel then proceeded to walk the jurors through 
the special verdict form: Was LeGrand Johnson Construction Company 
negligent in one or more of the particulars claimed by plaintiff? 
Yes. It had the duty to come up with the traffic control plan. 
They were supposed to broom the gravel off the shoulder and the 
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highway and they didn't do it. They were there every day, they 
knew how people were driving, and they knew people were driving at 
55 mph (R. 3008 at 63). And this negligence was a proximate cause 
because but/for that failure to control traffic, there wouldn't 
have been an accident. Id. 
McCorvey's counsel then immediately moved on to address 
briefly part II of the verdict form: 
Was the State negligent? That is the next question. 
Yes. They came up with the plan. That wasn't the . So 
their negligence is not as great as the contractor's. 
Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added). "They came up with the plan." In 
these six words, plaintiff articulated to the jury the 
"particulars" of his theory of negligence against UDOT referred to 
in the special verdict form. He then moved on to other issues, 
never to return to any alternative theories of UDOT's negligence. 
Having tried and argued his negligence case against UDOT to 
the jury on the sole theory that its traffic control plan was 
deficient, and having obtained from the jury an affirmative answer 
only to the question "Was the State negligent in approving this 
traffic control plan?", McCorvey may not on appeal reinvent his 
lawsuit and pretend that the jurors answered other questions they 
were never asked. Thus, to the extent McCorvey's opening brief 
purports to marshall "evidence" of negligence by UDOT other than 
that related to the traffic control plan, it should be disregarded. 
The only UDOT negligence found by the jury was negligence in 
approving a traffic control plan it found deficient, either because 
the jury found the signs in the plan were inadequate to warn of the 
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loose gravel hazard or because the plan failed to close the unswept 
outside lane until after sweeping (see UDOT's Opening Brief at 28-
29). It is only this negligence by UDOT that can be considered in 
determining whether the evidence is sufficient, as a matter or law, 
to support the jury's finding that UDOT's negligence was a 
proximate cause of the accident (Special Verdict Part IIB, R. 
02522). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Overview 
All the "factual" assertions in McCorvey's brief made without 
citation to the record for verification as required by Rule 
24(a)(7) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
including all of Section A of McCorvey's Statement of Facts 
(McCorvey Opening Brief at 4-5), should be disregarded. See 
Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
B. UDOT "Assuming" Liability and Fault3 at Trial 
Throughout his brief, McCorvey states that UDOT made a 
conscious tactical decision to shoulder responsibility for this 
accident in order to exculpate the contractor and thereby deprive 
McCorvey of more of the contractor's six million dollars of 
insurance coverage (e.g.. McCorvey Opening Brief at 6, 7 & nn. 2-3, 
58). McCorvey also contends it is a fact that UDOT attempted to 
3
 Contrary to McCorvey's assertion (McCorvey Opening Brief at 
7 n.5), UDOT does not claim that the jury should have assigned more 
fault to the contractor. One of UDOT's arguments in its Opening 
Brief was that there was no substantial evidence to support the 
jury's finding that McCorvey was less at fault than UDOT for this 
accident. This argument has, however, been withdrawn by UDOT, infra 
at 22-23. 
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"skew the jury verdict by accepting responsibility for this 
accident" and that it "deliberately" destroyed the insurance 
coverage protection held by the contractor for McCorvey's benefit 
(id. at 35, 38-39). These assertions are pure fantasy, bordering 
on deliberate misrepresentation. The "evidence" in Section B and 
elsewhere that McCorvey cuts and pastes to prove to this Court a 
conspiracy theory that was not the subject of factfinding in the 
trial court should, therefore, be disregarded. 
It was UDOT's position that this unfortunate accident was not 
the result of a defective traffic control plan or deficient traffic 
control implementation or misapplication of gravel chips by the 
contractor. Instead, it was caused solely by McCorvey's reckless 
speeding and racing with another reckless driver, Wright, in an 
obvious construction project that employed loose gravel as the 
resurfacing material (see Jury Instruction 32, R. 2560-61). In 
UDOT's view, McCorvey was blaming the supposed deep pockets, UDOT 
and the contractor, as scapegoats to recover for the costly 
consequences of his own bad judgment (R. 3009 at 75-83; R. 3008 at 
66). Nonetheless, the jury found independent negligence by both 
UDOT and by the contractor, and UDOT must live with those factual 
findings, which are not challenged in its cross-appeal. 
It was McCorvey's decision to sue UDOT for its own independent 
negligence in approving a traffic control plan that permitted 
speeds up to 55 mph on the unswept but rechipped right lane and did 
not physically close that lane off after sweeping. McCorvey told 
the jurors UDOT was thereby responsible for his injuries, though 
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less so than the contractor (R. 3008 at 63); they responded by 
finding UDOT 28% at fault and the contractor 50%. 
Although McCorvey pointedly told the jurors in closing 
argument (R. 3008 at 63) and in Instruction 34 (R. 02563) that he 
would recover nothing if they found his fault to be 50% or more, 
McCorvey never told them UDOT's ultimate financial liability for 
its share of the fault was limited by statute (challenged in his 
appeal and responded to below in Part II).4 Although McCorvey may 
now, because of this limit, regret bringing UDOT into this lawsuit 
at all or regret that his jury didn't apportion a greater 
percentage of fault to the highly insured contractor and a smaller 
percentage to UDOT, that is the calculated risk he ran by arguing 
to the jury that UDOT was negligent and at fault. 
C. The Amount of Gravel 
In Section C, McCorvey presents evidence about loose gravel on 
the shoulder of the swept inside lane and the unswept outside lane 
of 1-15 at the accident site. UDOT presented this evidence of the 
gravel throughout its brief (e.g., at 12-18, 22-25), including 
AIn another misrepresentation, McCorvey states that, by taking 
responsibility onto itself and away from the contractor and then 
invoking the $250,000 statutory damage limit, UDOT was able to use 
the statute to shield the contractor and reduce "the amount that 
LeGrand Johnson was required to indemnify the State." (McCorvey 
Opening Brief at 58 n.42). McCorvey made a similar accusation in 
the trial court and it went nowhere because, as he is well aware, 
there is no indemnity agreement between UDOT and LeGrand that would 
lead to such a result (R. 2999 at 15, 63, 64; R. 3000 at 8, 13). 
The standard indemnity agreement required by Section 107.14 of 
Utah' s Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction (R. 
02636) is relevant only if UDOT has paid out monies, under a 
vicarious liability theory, for injury caused by the contractor's 
negligence, not its own (Transcript of December 7, 1990 at 21, 25-
26). 
8 
plaintiff's expert's opinion that McCorvey lost control of his 
vehicle when his front wheels entered a 1 and 1/2" ridge of gravel 
at the edge of the shoulder of the inside (left) lane. McCorvey, 
however, mistakenly characterizes all testimony and other evidence 
concerning loose gravel as proof of "excessive" gravel.5 
As explained in UDOT's opening brief, the chip seal process of 
highway resurfacing involves putting down a thick layer of loose 
gravel and rolling the loose chips into a sticky emulsion. After 
rolling, most of the remaining loose chips are swept off the 
roadway. The faster you drive over a newly rechipped roadway, even 
if it has been swept, the more gravel chips you pull up out of the 
emulsion and send flying at any cars nearby. You can hear the 
gravel hit the wheel wells and undercarriage of your own car, you 
can see the chips being thrown up by other cars, and you can hear 
the chips tossed up by others that hit your car's exterior (R. 2998 
at 206). 
UDOT has never disputed that there was loose gravel in the 
5Like McCorvey, UDOT encourages members of the Court to 
actually look at all the photographs of the accident site (Exs. 3 
and 4, included as Addendum Item J to UDOT's Opening Brief). Exs. 
3k-m, 3o, 3z, 3x, 3z and 4c, photos taken where McCorvey lost 
control and went into the median, indisputably show some loose 
gravel chips, but not more than one would reasonably expect in a 
chip seal resurfacing zone. In Ex. 3k-m, the tops of the 2" high 
tabs are clearly visible as temporary markers between the two 
southbound lanes and on the innermost edge of the inside (left) 
lane of travel. There is nothing in any of the photographic 
exhibits, or in other testimonial evidence, to substantiate the 
wild claims of Brian Wright, brother of defendant Wayne Wright, 
that at the point where the Wright van stopped to cross over to the 
rolled McCorvey car, the loose gravel was 6-7" deep on the edge of 
the highway shoulder and 2-3" deep in the highway lanes themselves. 
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unswept outside lane and at the innermost edge of the shoulder of 
the swept inside lane. That is the nature of the chip seal 
process. UDOT's and McCorvey's opening briefs document well that 
he and Wright were both aware (and could not have been unaware) of 
the presence of loose gravel in both locations. They knew this all 
the time they were driving through the resurfacing project, but 
particularly in the last mile before the accident where McCorvey 
claimed the inside lane, which had been swept, had so much loose 
gravel in it he could barely keep control of his car. 
As the jury found, Wright acted unreasonably by passing 
illegally in the outside (right) lane at high speeds guaranteed to 
throw up the unswept loose gravel there onto McCorvey's car. As 
the jury additionally found, McCorvey acted unreasonably by 
accelerating and driving out of the lane of travel onto the far 
edge of the shoulder of the inside (left) lane during his high 
speed race to pass illegally the Wright van, instead of simply 
slowing down to evade flying gravel. 
In any event, as noted above under "Statement of the Case" at 
pages 2-6 & n.2, evidence about the amount of gravel in either 
southbound lane does not relate to any claim of negligence asserted 
or assertable by McCorvey against UDOT. Thus, it is relevant only 
as support for the jury's findings that: a) McCorvey and Wright 
each acted negligently under the circumstances they faced and were 
both proximate causes of this accident; and b) the contractor was 
negligent in carrying out the repaving operation. 
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D. Speed Limits 
According to UDOT's engineer, Richard Griffin, both before and 
at trial, the contractor was allowed to open the newly chipped 
outside (right) lane to traffic after rolling and before sweeping 
(R. 3004 at 190-91, 201, 227), a normal and customary industry 
practice (R. 3006 at 229, 236, 238, 260). The traffic control plan 
permitted a regulatory speed limit of 55 mph in the unswept outside 
lane because of the presence of "LOOSE GRAVEL" warning signs, 
numerous regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs, and the sight and sound of 
chips thrown up by cars moving too fast for conditions (R. 3004 at 
191, 197-98, 219-22; R. 2998 at 206). All of these would alert 
reasonable drivers of the need to drive at speeds below the 
regulatory limit as necessary in the resurfacing area to prevent 
damage to windshields and paint (R. 3004 at 196, 221-24). Most 
drivers would choose to travel the swept left lane instead of the 
unswept right lane (R. 3004 at 227; R. 3006 at 236). 
The jury concluded that the traffic control plan approved by 
UDOT negligently relied on the required warning signs and the 
highway drivers' own common sense to keep speeds below 55 mph on 
the newly chipped lanes if necessary to keep control of one's 
vehicle or to avoid throwing gravel onto other cars. However much 
it may disagree with this determination of negligence, UDOT does 
not challenge the negligence finding on appeal, although it does 
challenge the jury's finding on proximate causation. 
E. Missing Signs 
There is no evidence to support McCorvey's outlandish 
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assertion, at pages 22-23 and 49, that none of the warning signs 
required by the traffic control plan were in place at the time of 
his accident.6 Conflicting evidence concerning the witnesses' 
varying memories of what signs were posted where is presented in 
UDOT's Opening Brief at 14, 16, 18-20. McCorvey suggested at trial 
that the early warners, the "ROADWORK AHEAD" signs, and some of the 
twenty "DO NOT PASS" signs required by the traffic control plan 
were not in the planned position in the late afternoon of August 7, 
1986. But the lane closure signage in the traffic control plan 
approved by UDOT (Ex. 10) was applicable only where there was 
actual chip spreading and rolling going on in a traffic lane (R. 
3006 at 227-30, 234; R. 2998 at 205). No such work was going on in 
the two southbound lanes of 1-15 when the accident occurred. Since 
both southbound lanes of 1-15 were meant to be open, it is thus 
unremarkable, when viewed in context, that LeGrand employee David 
Merchant had taken down the "Right Lane Closed Ahead" signs and put 
them out of sight (R. 3006 at 75).7 
6Even if there were any evidence that no warning signs were in 
place, by finding McCorvey negligent the jury necessarily 
determined that McCorvey was nonetheless aware, or should have been 
aware, of the obvious hazard presented by loose gravel in the 
resurfacing project. 
7McCorvey misrepresents that UDOT employee Berry told Merchant 
to hide these signs just before McCorvey's accident (McCorvey 
Opening Brief at 26), citing to R. 3006 at 75 and 78. Merchant 
said no such thing. He testified that both southbound lanes of I-
1-15 were open and that he had not posted any "Right Lane Closed" 
or "Right Lane Closed Ahead" signs the day of the accident but had 
"set them up and then leaned them over on the side of the road so 
they couldn't be seen." (R. 3006 at 75). Three pages later he 
states that Berry instructed him generally where to put signs (Id. 
at 78), but there was no linkage to Berry directing him to take 
down and hide the the lane closure signs just before McCorvey came 
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In any case, as already discussed above at pages 2-6 & n.2, 
there was no claim asserted or assertable by McCorvey that UDOT 
negligently failed to inspect the construction zone that afternoon 
to see if every sign required by the approved traffic control plan 
was still in its planned place. Thus, any evidence that some signs 
were not in the positions claimed by the contractor's employee, 
Steven Peterson, and any evidence that some signs had been moved by 
the contractor into proper position after the accident (see 
McCorvey's Opening Brief at 25-28 & nn. 15-20) in time for 
photographs by its insurance lawyer, is germane only as additional 
support for the jury's finding of negligence and 50% fau. by the 
contractor in implementing the traffic control plan.8 
F. UDOT's Traffic Control Plan 
It is true that the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(MUTCD) has been adopted in Utah, and the traffic control plan for 
the project was supposed to adhere to it where applicable. 
Violation of an applicable standard could be some evidence that 
UDOT's traffic control plan unreasonably failed to comply with 
industry standards. It is also true that LeGrand was contractually 
required to construct and erect all signs on the project in 
accordance with the MUTCD (R. 2998 at 114). 
on the scene. 
8As even McCorvey's expert, Ruzak, recognized, traffic control 
on this project was ultimately the contractor's responsibility. 
The traffic control plan given to LeGrand by UDOT could have been 
rejected or modified before the project began, or it could have 
been unilaterally modified by LeGrand during the course of the 
project as necessary to prevent damage from flying gravel (R. 3000 
at 46, 47, 50, 60, 65). 
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McCorvey has not demonstrated how UDOT's traffic control plan 
violated an applicable standard in the MUTCD. As both sides' 
experts agreed, the MUTCD sets forth the minimum desirable 
standards for traffic control in a work zone in selected typical 
cases; it does not set legal requirements and it does not purport 
to cover every situation (R. 2998 at 175, 178; Ex. 38 at sections 
1A3-1A4; R. 3006 at 239-40; R. 3000 at 57). In effect, the MUTCD 
leaves a decision about what signs are necessary in a particular 
situation to the engineering judgment of the traffic control 
planners, but advises how they should be erected once deemed 
necessary (R. 2998 at 175, 178). The MUTCD does not say that a 
traffic control plan must close down a newly chipped roadway until 
after sweeping; it does not say the plan must not allow traffic to 
travel at normal highway speeds until after sweeping. 
At trial, McCorvey repeatedly suggested that the traffic 
control plan approved by UDOT (Ex. 10) unreasonably breached 
industry standards for lane closure set out in the MUTCD. In 
particular, the MUTCD diagram relied upon by McCorvey (Ex. 39, Item 
21 in McCorvey's Addendum) specifies how and where to place warning 
signs and traffic control devices in order to close one of two 
lanes of same-direction highway traffic while the lane to be closed 
was being worked on in a stationary maintenance project. The MUTCD 
contains no diagram illustrating signing for a chip resealing 
project, or any other maintenance project, that is moving down the 
highway instead of being stationary (see R. 3006 at 257). Even 
McCorvey admits that the MUTCD diagram was only designed to show 
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the signs and devices to be used to close a lane being worked on 
(McCorvey Opening Brief at 30). 
UDOT's traffic plan control plan (Ex. 10, Item 21 in 
McCorvey's Addendum) likewise sets out the signs and devices that 
were to be used in the Cove Fort Project to close a lane of traffic 
using early warners, with no channelizing devices such as inverted 
cones, only while resurfacing equipment was in the closed lane 
spreading emulsion and chips and then rolling them (Ex. 10; R. 3004 
at 191-93). 
However, as the UDOT engineer on this project readily admitted 
and as even McCorvey's counsel recognized in closing argument 
(e.g. , R. 3008 at 54, 64), the outside unswept lane was open to 
traffic beyond the interchange ramps at the time of McCorvey's 
accident (R. 3004 at 190-91). All of the resurfacing equipment was 
off the southbound lanes of 1-15 and was resurfacing the ramps at 
milemarker 135 (R. 2998 at 192). The contractor was required by 
the Standard Specifications used in Utah to open the lane to 
traffic once it had been rolled (Ex. 110; R. 3000 at 67). 
Thus, even if the traffic control plan approved by UDOT 
violated MUTCD guidelines for how to close effectively a lane in 
the work zone—because it did not use cones or barrels to channel 
traffic to the unclosed lane—that deficiency would be irrelevant 
here. First, the lanes in which McCorvey and Wright were 
travelling at the time of the accident were, and were meant to be, 
physically open to normal traffic. Second, the accident occurred 
nearly a mile beyond the work zone at the ramps, and it was only 
15 
the work zone itself that the lane closure signage in both the UDOT 
traffic control plan and the MUTCD diagram was meant to control (R. 
2998 at 211, 183). In the opinion of UDOT expert Leuttich, who 
chaired for eleven years the committee that drafted the MUTCD 
standards, UDOT's traffic control plan had nothing to do with this 
accident, however insufficient it was to close the outside lane in 
the work zone where the on- and off-ramps were being rechipped (R. 
3006 at 227, 228, 230). Despite MUTCD's inapplicability here, 
however, the jury could have nonetheless found negligence in the 
traffic control plan's failure to require that the unswept lane be 
closed until swept, and UDOT does not challenge on appeal this 
finding of negligence. 
G. The Road Race between McCorvev and Wright 
As discussed above and in UDOT's Opening Brief, it was UDOT's 
theory of the case that McCorvey and Wright were both negligent in 
illegally passing and racing with each other at speeds that were 
illegal and far in excess of what prudence required in obviously 
hazardous driving conditions, i.e., a road resurfacing project 
using gravel chips on the roadway. McCorvey claimed he was next to 
the Wright van and was getting hit by gravel being thrown by it 
from the outside lane; all the witnesses who were in the Wright van 
claimed, on the other hand, that McCorvey had accelerated and 
passed them by several car lengths by the time he lost control of 
his vehicle. Even if the jury believed McCorvey, believed his car 
was being hit with gravel thrown by Wright's speeding van 
immediately before he left the road, all he had to do to avoid the 
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gravel was take his foot off the gas or tap his brakes. Instead, 
McCorvey lost control of his small sports car in loose gravel on 
the shoulder of the roadway precisely because he was speeding and 
then accelerated even more and moved off the normal lane of travel 
in an attempt to pass (Jury Instruction 32, R. 02560-61). 
McCorvey wants to ignore the evidence of his own reckless and 
life-threatening behavior in the face of obviously hazardous 
driving conditions in this resurfacing area. The evidence should, 
however, be viewed in a light favorable to the jury's explicit 
finding that McCorvey and Wright were negligent as alleged. 
Defendants claimed that they were each negligent in failing to: 
keep a reasonable lookout for other vehicles and road conditions, 
keep their cars under control, and drive at speeds safe for the 
conditions on the highway. (Jury Instruction 32, R. 02560-61). 
McCorvey's own accident reconstructionist testified he was 
travelling up to 65 mph on the roadway just before he lost control 
of his car (R. 3002 at 28, 54-55, 61); Brian Wright also estimated 
McCorvey's speed at 60-65 mph (R. 3007 at 143, 154). 
By finding that McCorvey and Wright were negligent as claimed 
by UDOT, the jury rejected the two speeding drivers' claims that 
they were innocently unaware of the hazard presented by the gravel 
they knew was on the road and that McCorvey was hopelessly 
"trapped" by gravel being thrown by Wright's vehicle. As detailed 
in UDOT's opening brief at pages 10-25, there is overwhelming 
evidence to support the jury's findings of negligence by McCorvey 
and by Wright, neither of which McCorvey challenges on appeal. 
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H. Evidence Purportedly Related to the Unconstitutionality of the 
Statutory Damage Cap 
UDOT has not challenged or attempted to downplay the nature and 
extent of McCorvey's serious injuries or pain, or his daily need as 
a paralyzed quadriplegic for round-the-clock care (UDOT Opening 
Brief at 4-5; McCorvey Opening Brief at 37). UDOT likewise has not 
challenged or hidden the large amount of special and general 
damages the jury found (id.* at 26). UDOT accordingly considers it 
inappropriate for McCorvey to recite in section HI testimony about 
the extent of his pain and debilitation and the details of his 
girlfriend's role in his excretory functions, under the pretense 
that it is relevant to the legal issue of whether the statutory 
damage cap violates the Utah Constitution. 
Finally, as addressed above under section B, there is simply 
no record support for McCorvey's assertion as "fact" in section H2 
that UDOT "intentionally shouldered responsibility for this 
accident" in order to shift fault onto itself and away from the 
heavily insured contractor. 
ARGUMENT 
A. UDOT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALLED ALL EVIDENCE 
RELEVANT TO ITS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIMS 
UDOT has adequately marshalled the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and findings of UDOT's negligence in approving the 
traffic control plan, as well as evidence of the causative link 
between that negligence and the accident. UDOT is under no burden 
to marshall evidence supporting other theories of negligence that 
the jury was not asked to decide, which McCorvey is belatedly 
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injecting into his lawsuit to make the jury's finding on proximate 
causation effectively unreviewable on appeal. 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, UDOT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT 
A PROXIMATE CAUSE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A 
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN BRINGING ABOUT THE HARM. 
UDOT does not contend that its actions or omissions could 
never be a substantial factor in causing a highway accident. As 
noted above, McCorvey argued to the jury that UDOT was negligent 
because it approved a deficient traffic control plan. It is this 
negligent conduct which must be considered when evidence concerning 
the chain of proximate causation is evaluated for its legal 
sufficiency. He cannot now introduce other alternative theories of 
negligence against UDOT, such as that UDOT negligently failed to 
inspect the project to see that all signs required by the traffic 
control plan were in place on the afternoon of August 7, 1986, or 
that UDOT should have inspected the swept inside (left) lane where 
McCorvey lost control of his car and removed any excess gravel from 
the shoulder. 
If, in accordance with McCorvey's theory of negligence, the 
jury found that the traffic control plan's failure to close the 
unswept right lane created an unreasonable risk of harm to drivers, 
it could also have found that this omission was a cause in fact of 
the accident because there would likely have been no illegal 
passing using the unswept right hand lane if it had been physically 
closed off to traffic. However, causation in fact is alone 
insufficient to establish proximate cause, which also embodies a 
policy requirement that the negligence be a substantial factor in 
19 
bringing about the injury in order to be a proximate cause, or 
legal cause, of it. (UDOT Opening Brief at 28-34). In light of 
the evidence and the jury's findings that McCorvey and Wright were 
negligent as claimed, by speeding and passing in loose gravel, and 
that these negligent acts were proximate causes of his injury, 
UDOT's negligence could not, as a matter of law, have been a 
substantial causative factor in this accident. (.Id. at 32-39). 
The cases cited by McCorvey do not resolve this issue to the 
contrary. In Boccarossa v. Department of Transp., 190 Mich. App. 
313, 475 N.W.2d 390 (1991), plaintiff was injured in a head-on 
collision on the two-lane highway when the oncoming driver 
attempted to pass. The highway department was accused of negligent 
failure to designate this section of the road as a no passing zone. 
The appellate court reversed a verdict for the highway department 
that was based on the erroneous legal conclusion that compliance 
with MUTCD standards for when a "no passing" designation was 
required rendered the department not negligent as a matter or law. 
Id. The issues of the department's negligence and proximate 
causation were accordingly remanded for retrial. In Jordan v. 
Jones, 314 N.C.106, 331 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1985), the court reversed 
a summary judgment in favor of the highway department because 
uncontradicted evidence showed that its allegedly negligent failure 
to install a flashing light at an intersection violated the express 
requirement of the applicable MUTCD standard. Thus, there was a 
genuine issue of material fact about whether the department was 
negligent and whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the 
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injury. Id.9 
These cases demonstrate only that the issue of whether one 
actor's negligent conduct is a proximate cause of an injury is 
entirely dependent on what that conduct was and when it took place 
in the chain of events, as well as on the particular nature and 
sequence of other actors' conduct found to be proximate causes of 
the injury. 
C. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE LEGALLY UNFORESEEABLE 
SUBSEQUENT NEGLIGENCE OF THE CONTRACTOR ALONE, 
OR THAT OF MCCORVEY AND WRIGHT, CONSTITUTED A 
SUPERSEDING, INTERVENING PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
McCorvey does not dispute UDOT's contention that the 
subsequent negligence of LeGrand was a superseding proximate cause 
of his injuries because it was unforeseeable as a matter of law. 
He does, however, argue that the subsequent negligent acts of 
McCorvey and Wright were foreseeable because UDOT should have known 
that chip seal resurfacing agitates impatient drivers and impatient 
drivers do not obey regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs, do not stay out 
of lanes with loose gravel in them, and do not pay heed to obvious 
driving hazards as a restraint on their speed. This argument is a 
variation on the theme McCorvey used at trial: It is foreseeable 
that highway drivers will violate traffic laws and that they will 
9In the other case relied upon by McCorvey, Dubois v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 201 (La.App. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 
367 (La. 1991), there was no issue raised concerning the "legal 
cause" arm of proximate cause at issue in the instant case. The 
negligence claim against the highway department was based on its 
negligent inspection of the roadway and shoulder and resulting 
failure to remove gravel. The appellate court refused to overturn 
the factfinder's determination that this negligence was a cause in 
fact of the accident. Id. at 204. 
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drive recklessly in the face of obvious hazards, and it is 
therefore UDOT's responsibility to make it physically impossible 
for lawless and reckless drivers to hurt themselves or others, 
UDOT has neither the responsibility nor the ability to make 
imprudent or reckless driving impossible on our public highways. 
One can expect that compliance with posted speed limits and "DO NOT 
PASS" and other warning signs will never be 100%. But UDOT could 
not reasonably have foreseen that, after travelling through ten 
miles of resurfacing project in broad daylight, past the warning 
signs and twenty "DO NOT PASS" signs required by its plan, McCorvey 
would race his lightweight sports car against Wright's heavy truck 
in a section of the freeway that had obviously been resurfaced with 
loose gravel. Their intervening negligent acts, or the negligence 
of the contractor in leaving loose gravel on the inside highway 
shoulder, constitute intervening superseding causes of this 
accident as a matter of law (UDOT Opening Brief at 39-46). 
D. UDOT WITHDRAWS ITS INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM 
REGARDING THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT 
BETWEEN UDOT AND MCCORVEY 
In preparing this reply brief, UDOT's counsel realized that 
the argument on this point was based on the premise that UDOT's 
liability would be zero if its fault was less than that of 
McCorvey. However, UDOT has not contended that the "unit rule" of 
determining whether a plaintiff can recover at all from multiple 
defendants does not apply under the current comparative fault 
statute. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 
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903 (Utah 1984) (interpreting prior comparative negligence statute 
as embracing "unit rule"). Under the unit rule approach, UDOT is 
not liable only if the fault of all defendants is less than that of 
McCorvey. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1992). Since the result 
sought on cross-appeal by UDOT would not follow even if the Court 
agreed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the 
jury's allocation of fault as between it and McCorvey, UDOT 
withdraws Issue 2 and Argument II in its opening brief on this 
point (UDOT Opening Brief at 2, 47-50). 
E. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN AND 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING THE "SUDDEN PERIL" 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
UDOT claims it was prejudicial error to give the sudden peril 
emergency instruction under our system of comparative fault since 
it erroneously implies that normal negligence standards are 
inapplicable to the party claiming its protections, unfairly 
emphasizes the evidence of that actor, and improperly tends to 
excuse the fault of that actor (UDOT Opening Brief at 51-56). 
Because this claim was not presented to the trial court as an 
alternative objection to the sudden peril instruction, UDOT 
respectfully requests that this Court exercise its discretion and 
nonetheless address the merits of the question "in the interests of 
justice" pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This exception to the normal waiver rule embodies the concept of 
"plain error," Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991), which encompasses the two related requirements of 
obviousness and harmfulness, State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 
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(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Both prongs of the 
plain error test are satisfied in this case. 
The critical issue here was whether McCorvey's loss of control 
of his car in loose gravel was primarily his fault because of his 
speeding and illegal passing or the defendants' fault for failing 
to post more warnings or protect him from himself and Wright. In 
this circumstance, the sudden peril jury instruction assumed key 
importance in telling the jury how to assess the fault to attach to 
each party's conduct. Absent the confusing and incorrect statement 
of current negligence law in Instruction 33 and its creation of 
jury bias favoring McCorvey's tendered excuse for his actions, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have judged 
his conduct differently and returned a special verdict more 
favorable to defendants by attributing more fault to McCorvey than 
to them. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). 
Because of the substantial impact the instruction had on the jury's 
assessment of relative fault in this case, Instruction 33 was 
harmful. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 796-97; Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36. 
Second, in light of the Utah appellate courts' prior rulings 
in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), Jacobsen Constr, Co. 
v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), and Donahue 
v. Purfee, 780 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990), regarding the incorrectness under a 
comparative negligence system of jury instructions about analogous 
tort doctrines of last clear chance, assumption of the risk, and 
open and obvious danger, the error in giving any sudden peril 
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instruction should have been obvious to the trial court. 
Eldredqe, 773 P.2d at 335. For these reasons, this case is 
appropriate for the Court's exercise of its discretion to review 
the claimed error despite UDOT's failure to specifically raise it 
in the trial court. 
If the merits are reached, there is no logical basis on which 
to hold that the sudden emergency doctrine, created for precisely 
the same reasons in the days of contributory negligence as the 
other special tort doctrines already done away with by Utah courts, 
nonetheless remains viable in Utah. Although courts facing the 
issue of whether the sudden emergency doctrine survived the 
adoption of a comparative negligence system have not all reached 
the same conclusion, the better reasoned decisions cited in UDOT's 
opening brief hold that it does not because these courts were 
willing to look realistically at the impact the instruction has on 
the jury's deliberative process. See also Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 
364, 369-72 (Colo. 1991) (dissenting opinion). 
In addition to being inconsistent with a comparative 
negligence system, the sudden peril instruction is prejudicial 
because of its susceptibility to misinterpretation that leads to a 
jury's application of different principles of negligence to 
10Even if the error was not readily apparent, the issue should 
nonetheless be reviewed because of the extreme harmfulness of the 
sudden peril instruction in this case. State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 
at 35 n.9. Since the jury excused McCorvey by finding him only 10% 
at fault, although he was admittedly aware of the loose gravel on 
the road and could easily have avoided injury by slowing down, 
justice requires that this case be retried by a jury that assesses 
his negligence and fault without an instruction biased in his 
favor. 
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different parties, id. at 370; Knapp v. Stanford, 392 So,2d 196, 
198 (Miss. 1980), and to a belief that an emergency excuses the 
duty of ordinary care. Young, 814 P. 2d at 371 (dissenting 
opinion); Simonson v. White, 220 Mont. 14, 713 P.2d 983, 989 
(1986). It also focuses the jury only on the requesting party's 
conduct during and after the emergency, overlooking and excusing 
that party's conduct beforehand: 
Where there is definite evidence of negligence on the 
part of the [party requesting the instruction], the 
weight of such evidence might be entirely destroyed by an 
instruction on sudden emergency. Such an instruction 
might well cause the jury to lose sight of the negligence 
which caused the emergency. 
Young, 814 P.2d at 371-72 (dissenting opinion; quoting Kline v. 
Emmele. 204 Kan. 629, 465 P.2d 970, 973 (1970)); see also Solt v. 
Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474, 477 (1971) (sudden peril 
instruction "tends to lead the jury to a belief that the Court 
thought there was a sudden emergency presented to a careful driver 
free from any negligence."). For these reasons, the instruction 
should be banned and UDOT should be granted a new trial at which no 
sudden peril instruction is given. 
Even if this objection to the sudden peril instruction is 
rejected, UDOT did preserve at trial its claim that the evidence 
did not support the instruction. As argued in its Opening Brief 
at pages 56-58, even McCorvey's version at trial of what he knew 
and saw and did just prior to losing control of his car compels the 
conclusion, as a matter of law, that there either was no sudden 
emergency at all, or any sudden emergency faced on the roadway was 
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the product of his own negligence.11 
There was no sudden emergency here when Wright's van threw 
gravel up onto McCorvey's Honda, He said he had difficulty in 
loose gravel in the left lane for 3/4 of a mile before the accident 
(R. 3003 at 19, 70, 71, 75). If he was travelling only 55 mph from 
milemarker 135 south, he had 52.3 seconds in which to take action 
to avoid gravel thrown up from Wright's van by merely slowing down 
and letting Wright rapidly overtake him.12 He saw the loose gravel 
in the right lane (R. 3003 at 72). He had ample enough time to try 
to block Wright from passing on the right (R. 3003 at 97-99), and 
then to anticipate danger from flying gravel if Wright tried to 
pass him there (R. 3003 at 100). 
Finally, if there was an "emergency" once Wright's van 
actually started to throw gravel at his car, McCorvey's own 
testimony demonstrates that he was negligent as a matter of law in 
creating the emergency by refusing to slow down and drop away from 
the Wright vehicle. Thus, it was error for the trial court to give 
nThus, any emergency he faced in the median was also a result 
of his own negligence. 
12Contrary to McCorvey's assertion on page 49, he did not 
testify that "the events leading up to the accident all occurred in 
less than two seconds." This was the period he assigned to the 
time between Page flipping the bird to the Wrights and his leaving 
the road (R. 3003 at 31). It is likewise simply untrue that 
McCorvey and the other motorists all testified that there were no 
warnings of the hazards they encountered on the roadway, as claimed 
in McCorvey's Opening Brief at p. 49. UDOT's Opening Brief at 
pages 10-20 details substantial evidence concerning the numerous 
"DO NOT PASS" and warning signs in place at the time, the known and 
obvious presence of resurfacing equipment and highway workers, and 
the presence of loose gravel on the highway in both southbound 
lands as admittedly perceived by McCorvey and other drivers. 
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the instruction. Keller v. Shellev, 551 P.2d 513, 514 (Utah 1976); 
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc. , 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347, 
378 (1943). In the absence of that error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have returned a verdict more 
favorable to defendants by finding McCorvey more at fault than 
defendants. The trial court therefore abused its discretion in 
denying UDOT a new trial on this basis. UDOT requests that this 
denial be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL B. McCORVEY, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION: and LeGRAND 
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant• 
REPLY BRIEF OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AS 
CROSS-APPELLANT (PART I) and RESPONSE BRIEF OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEE (PART II) 
PART II. RESPONSE BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the civil judgment entered in favor of 
Daniel McCorvey against UDOT for the statutory maximum of $250,000 
permitted under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-34 (1989). Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does the Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of 
governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in 
section 63-30-34, infringe upon any substantial right protected by 
the state constitution's open courts provision? 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine, in light of its 
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negative conclusion on Issue 1, that traditional due process and 
equal protection analysis under the state constitution placed on 
McCorvey the burden to overcome the damage cap statute's 
presumption of constitutionality and that he had failed to make any 
such showing? 
3. If the trial court erred and this Court holds that the damage 
cap in section 63-30-34 violates the Utah Constitution insofar as 
it limits recovery from a governmental entity performing a 
governmental function, must it also strike down the balance of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, including the waivers of immunity in 
sections 63-30-8 and -10, as inseverable? 
These issues present questions of law, on which this Court 
reviews any lower court ruling for correctness. City of Monticello 
v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 
120 (1990); Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are 
set forth in the body of, or in the Addendum to, this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The jury's special verdict found McCorvey's damages to be 
$5,421,282 and UDOT's 28% share to be $1,517,800 (R. 02521-23). 
UDOT filed a motion to reduce the judgment against it to the 
statutory maximum of $250,000 in the Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989) (Addendum Item A). In response, 
McCorvey contended that the decision of this Court in Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P. 2d 348 (Utah 1989), compelled the 
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conclusion that application of the statutory damage cap contravened 
the Utah Constitution (Memorandum, R. 02603-05, Addendum Item B). 
McCorvey characterized Condemarin, his sole legal authority, as 
mandating a heightened or intermediate level of constitutional 
scrutiny in any challenge to the damage cap statute under either 
the due process or equal protection provisions, thereby shifting to 
UDOT the burden of going forward with evidence to justify it. This 
followed, he reasoned, from this Court's purported majority 
conclusion in Condemarin that every injured person has a 
substantial right to a remedy for a personal injury and this right 
is constitutionally protected by the open courts provision, 
regardless of whether that injury resulted from the State's 
performance of a governmental function (R. 3025, 3027, 3039, 3040, 
3044). 
In his memorandum decision (R. 02667-68, Addendum Item C), 
Judge Michael R. Murphy rejected this broad reading of the various 
opinions in Condemarin, agreeing with UDOT (R. 02646-50) that no 
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny applied because there 
was no right at common law to any recovery from a governmental 
entity for injuries resulting from its performance of a 
governmental function, including the maintenance of public 
highways. Since adoption of the state constitution's open courts 
provision did not alter the doctrine of sovereign immunity, no 
constitutionally protected "right" was infringed by application of 
the damage cap to those in McCorvey's position. Thus, traditional 
due process and equal protection analysis applied, and he had not 
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met his burden of overcoming the statute's presumptive 
constitutionality. Judgment against UDOT was accordingly entered 
for $250,000 (R. 2659-63). 
On appeal, McCorvey once again relies on his interpretation of 
the several opinions in Condemarin to support his generalized claim 
that the damage cap in section 63-30-34 violates the state 
constitution's open courts, equal protection, and due process 
guarantees in article I, sections 7, 11, and 24. (Opening Brief at 
51-58). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Governmental Immunity Act embraces the principle of 
sovereign immunity for governmental entities performing 
governmental functions and then waives that immunity up to $250,000 
in some circumstances. To the extent the Utah Legislature has 
statutorily waived absolute immunity from suit for injuries 
incurred in an entity's performance of a governmental function, 
including the maintenance of public highways, it has not deprived 
the injured person of any right protected by the open courts 
provision. Instead, it has extended a benefit by permitting a 
governmental entity to be sued for conduct that would have been 
immunized at common law. Thus, application of the cap in section 
63-30-34 to limit damages recoverable by a person whose right of 
action is created in other sections of the Governmental Immunity 
Act does not infringe any right protected by the open courts 
provision, and the two-part test in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Co. , 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985), is inapplicable to 
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this case. 
The various opinions in Condemarin did not hold that an 
injured person in McCorvey's position has a fundamental or 
specially protected right to recover full damages from a 
governmental entity performing a governmental function, subjecting 
section 63-30-34's limit on full recovery to a heightened level of 
constitutional scrutiny. Since McCorvey erroneously relied on 
Condemarin to shift onto UDOT the burden of establishing the 
constitutionality of the damage cap, the trial court correctly 
ruled that he failed to carry his burden of overcoming the 
presumption of constitutionality of section 63-30-34 and proving 
that the Governmental Immunity Act's creation of a right of action 
limited to $250/000 in damages in such circumstances violates state 
due process or equal protection guarantees. 
This Court has already held that governmental immunity does 
not violate the equal protection guarantee in article I, § 24 of 
the Utah Constitution. Since the legislature can constitutionally 
retain absolute sovereign immunity, it can constitutionally waive 
that immunity only up to a fixed dollar amount. Thus, the right of 
action up to $250,000 the Act gives to victims of governmental 
tortfeasors does not create an unreasonable classification treating 
them differently from victims of nongovernmental tortfeasors. The 
doctrine of sovereign immunity itself does that. 
Section 63-30-34 treats all beneficiaries of the Governmental 
Immunity Act the same by capping at the same dollar amount all 
judgments against governmental entities for personal injuries 
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resulting from the discharge of a governmental function. It is not 
inherently unreasonable for the legislature, once it has chosen to 
waive absolute sovereign immunity/ to opt for limited liability 
instead of unlimited liability, particularly in light of: the 
magnitude and nature of governmental functions; the potential for 
liability in performing such functions; the need for some certainty 
in projecting future liability costs as part of a comprehensive 
risk management program; and the need to pay for essential 
governmental functions and judgments from public treasuries 
generated by reasonable tax burdens. 
The Governmental Immunity Act serves the legitimate purposes 
of compensating many victims of governmental tortfeasors who would 
otherwise have no recovery, while preserving the public treasury 
from unpredictable large judgments that would curtail government's 
ability to function. A damage cap, set at a fixed amount 
appropriately through the legislative process, is a reasonable 
means for achieving those purposes. Section 63-30-34 specifically 
provides a nonarbitrary maximum recovery figure with which 
governmental entities can rationally plan for and tax for their 
future liability and for other necessary government expenditures. 
It violates neither the due process nor the uniform operation of 
the laws provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
The damage cap likewise does not violate an article I, section 
10 right to jury trial of victims of governmental tortfeasors who 
had no right of action at all at common law, an issue that McCorvey 
did not preserve in the trial court. A jury still determines the 
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facts and assesses damages, which are the protections afforded by 
article I, section 10. 
Finally, if application of the damage cap in section 63-30-34 
to limit the liability of a governmental entity performing a 
governmental function is held to violate any provision of the Utah 
Constitution, this Court must also invalidate, as inseparable, the 
balance of the Governmental Immunity Act. As the legislative 
history makes clear, the legislature would not have adopted 
unlimited liability and waived absolute immunity for governmental 
functions in the Act without the damage cap on liability. Without 
the Governmental Immunity Act, McCorvey has no right to a remedy 
from UDOT at all and the judgment against UDOT must, therefore, be 
vacated. 
ARGUMENTS 
Introduction 
McCorvey's state constitutional challenges to the damage cap 
in the Governmental Immunity Act must be considered in light of the 
history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the principle that 
the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. 
Sovereign immunity was a well-settled feature of American common 
law when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution. Madsen 
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983); Galleoos v. Midvale 
Citv, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (1972); Wilkinson v. 
State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913). Although not without 
its critics, e.g., Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv, 100 Utah 573, 111 
P.2d 800, 804 (1941) (concurring opinion of Wolfe, J.), the 
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doctrine has nonetheless been applied continually by the courts of 
this state to immunize governmental entities from tort liability 
when carrying out a governmental function, absent any waiver of 
immunity. E.g. , Ramirez v. Oaden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P. 2d 
463, 464 (1955), and cases cited therein; see also Condemarin, 775 
P.2d at 349 (separate opinion of Durham, J.); id. at 370-71 
(separate opinion of Stewart, J.); l£L» a t 383 (dissenting opinion 
of Hall, C.J.). 
In 1963, the Utah Legislature directed the Utah Legislative 
Council to study the effects of the waiver of governmental immunity 
enjoyed at common law upon the state, its political subdivisions, 
and municipal corporations. House Joint Resolution 21 (March 14, 
1963) (Addendum Item D). A twenty-one member Governmental Immunity 
Committee of legislators, laypersons, and representatives of 
governmental units was formed by the Council at the legislature's 
direction and met monthly for two years. 36th Utah Legislature, 
Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965. The committee 
gathered data about liability insurance costs and availability, and 
prepared numerous working drafts of legislation. Report and 
Recommendations of the Utah Legislative Council 1963-65 at 45-46 
(Addendum Item E). 
In its final report, the Council recommended legislation that 
reaffirmed the doctrine of governmental immunity, but waived that 
immunity in certain exceptional circumstances where deemed required 
"as a matter of justice." .Id. at 48. The Council concluded that 
injury resulting from the negligence of governmental employees 
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performing governmental functions was such an exceptional 
circumstance, but it recognized that open-ended liability would 
endanger governmental operating budgets and substantially interfere 
with the governmental entities' ability to fulfill the functions 
required of government: 
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person 
and property by negligent acts of government employees 
and by the construction of public improvements. In many 
of these cases no recourse against the governmental 
entity has been possible. It was found that the present 
system works substantial injustice to citizens. There is 
a fear, however, among government officials, that to open 
the door to unrestrained claims would be too burdensome 
upon governmental funds. 
Id. at 46. Proposed legislation along the lines suggested by the 
Council, Senate Bill 4, the Governmental Immunity Act, was 
ultimately recommended for passage by the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary in January 1965. 1965 Senate Journal at 101. The 
Committee reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immunity needed 
to be modified in our modern society to do equity to injured 
citizens, but pointed out that the recommended bill empowered 
governmental entities to protect themselves by purchasing liability 
insurance. Id. 
At the bill's reading, copies of the Legislative Council's 
report were distributed. Bill sponsor Senator Charles Welch, Jr., 
recited numerous examples of personal injuries suffered at the 
hands of governmental employees negligently performing their duties 
where no compensation from the employer entity was possible because 
of the common law governmental immunity doctrine. He repeatedly 
stressed to his colleagues that the injuries incurred worked the 
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same hardship whether the negligent tortfeasor was a government 
employee or a private citizen. However, he also repeatedly 
recounted to them the experiences of California, Nevada, and 
Arizona in which many millions of dollars in claims were filed 
against governmental entities in the period after their state 
appellate courts had abolished governmental immunity as a common 
law doctrine, but before state lawmakers had had a chance to adopt 
controlling legislation. Endorsing his bill's "middle of the road 
course" between absolute immunity and unlimited liability, Welch 
encouraged his colleagues to address the issue legislatively, 
before the Utah courts did, and to "open the doors" to suits 
involving injury "[b]ut not to open that door wide open where it 
would be detrimental to the State or its subdivisions." 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965; 36th 
Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965. 
Injured persons would thus be protected by the waivers of immunity, 
while governmental entities and the public would be protected by 
the statutory limitation on the amount of liability. 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965. 
The record of legislative debate of Senate Bill 4 reveals that 
many legislators were skeptical about Welch's claim that this was 
only a partial opening of the litigation door. Some were concerned 
about the "real costs" of the bill, particularly the increased 
costs to entities for liability insurance coverage or for defending 
the rash of suits likely to ensue because of the waivers of 
immunity. Id., disc IV. Others were concerned that entities with 
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restricted mill levies or tax bases could not raise enough money to 
pay for insurance premiums or for large judgments. 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965. 
Senator Welch attempted to allay these fears by pointing out the 
bill's dollar limit cap on any judgment obtained where immunity had 
been waived. Id. Representative Bullock believed that some 
control would be provided by the presence on the jury of taxpayers, 
who would ultimately have to foot the bill. JEd. Representative 
Buckner expressed his reluctant support of the bill, warning his 
colleagues, 
I would hate to see the door open too wide. But on the 
opposite side of the coin, I think we have very little 
choice facing us based upon the history of surrounding 
states and what has happened when a court test has gone 
to the supreme court and they have thrown out completely 
the governmental immunity. I think the people of this 
State are entitled to some defense and unless we get 
something like this on the books that's been studied for 
many years, I think we have some real problems facing us. 
Id. Several legislators remarked that many of their constituents, 
particularly those from sparsely populated counties and small 
municipalities, strongly opposed the bill and had urged them to 
vote against it. One legislator opposed the bill as "an automatic 
increase in property tax" by each taxing entity, while another 
suggested that they enact only that portion of the bill adopting 
absolute governmental immunity and not enact any waiver provisions. 
id. 
Senate Bill 4 was, in fact, defeated in the House vote that 
took place after these discussions, with 31 votes in favor of 
passage and 36 against. Id.; 1965 House Journal at 341. On 
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reconsideration, Representative Harding, House sponsor of Senate 
Bill 4, told his colleagues the bill was defeated only because of 
a misunderstanding that it would bankrupt government entities with 
million dollar judgments. He referred them again to section 34 of 
the bill, which required a court to reduce any judgment to the 
dollar amount of the liability limit set by section 29, telling 
them there was no opportunity for a judgment in excess of that 
damage cap amount. Id. 
Noting that the bill was drafted by a committee with eight 
lawyers on it and recounting how a New Jersey School District had 
been bankrupted by one large personal injury judgment, 
Representative Prior rose in opposition to the bill, saying that 
supporters' representations about how minimal the increased costs 
would be "do not jibe with real experience." After pointing out 
that tort claims against the state of California had jumped from 
$4.71 million to $9.75 million in the year following judicial 
abolition of common law governmental immunity, Prior added, "Now, 
these are the things that our communities are fearful of that will 
bankrupt the subdivisions of our state[.]" Id. 
Despite these concerns, the House nonetheless passed the bill 
by a 41-25 vote. 1965 House Journal at 343. The Governmental 
Immunity Act, went into effect July 1, 1966. 1965 Utah Laws, ch. 
139 (Addendum Item F). In Section 3, the legislature adopted 
immunity from suit of all governmental entities "for any injury 
that may result from the activities of said entities wherein said 
entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental 
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function," except as otherwise provided for in the Act, Immunity 
was waived for defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions on roads, 
highways and sidewalks, as well as for nonlatent defects in public 
structures and public improvements. 1965 Utah Laws, ch. 139, §§ 8, 
9. Immunity from suit was also waived for injuries proximately 
caused by the negligence of government employees acting within the 
scope of their employment, with numerous exceptions to waiver. 
Id., § 10. Senator Welch had repeatedly told his colleagues these 
exceptions in section 10 were specifically intended to protect the 
entities by retaining immunity in some circumstances. 36th Utah 
Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965, disc 
II. Political subdivisions of the State were authorized in Section 
27 to impose taxes to pay judgments, or to settle or defend claims. 
Section 28 authorized entities to purchase liability insurance. 
Section 34 required a court to reduce to the amounts listed in 
Section 29 ($100,000 per injured person and $300,000 per accident) 
or to the amount of any insurance coverage in excess of those 
figures, any judgment obtained in an action for which immunity had 
been waived by the Act. 
Section 29 was repealed by 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130, § 5, but 
its liability limitations were incorporated into reenacted section 
34, which was rewritten essentially into the form it took at the 
time of McCorvey's judgment, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1989) 
(Addendum Item A). In the reenactment process, the personal injury 
damage caps were raised to $250,000 per person and $500,000 per 
accident by Substitute House Bill 289. 1983 Utah Laws, ch. 130, § 
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3, House Bill 289's increase in the liability limit from that in 
effect since 1965 was described as intended to "reflect more fairly 
current recovery levels." 1983 General Session, Governmental 
Immunity Act Amendments, Explanation Material, para. 2 [on file in 
the bill file at Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel]. 
According to the bill's sponsor, Representative Gayle 
McKeachnie, this and other 1983 amendments to the Governmental 
Immunity Act were negotiated as a package deal by the League of 
Cities and Towns, the Association of Counties, representatives from 
the Attorney General's Office and higher education, and plaintiffs' 
attorneys. 44th Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, 
February 24, 1983, disc I. 
Six years later, in Condemarin, 775 P. 2d at 366, Justices 
Durham, Zimmerman, and Stewart reached the limited holding that the 
$100,000 damage cap imposed by sections 63-30-29 and -34 before 
1983 is "unconstitutional" only as applied to limit recovery from 
University Hospital in a medical malpractice action. Although a 
majority could not agree on which constitutional provision was 
violated by the damage cap in that case, as discussed below the 
starting point for the three concurring justices' heightened 
scrutiny under both the equal protection and due process provisions 
was the open courts guarantee in article I, § 11. 
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A. BECAUSE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ENJOYED COMPLETE 
COMMON LAW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES 
ARISING FROM THEIR PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTIONS WHEN THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION WAS 
ADOPTED, THERE WAS AND IS NO SUBSTANTIAL 
"RIGHT" TO RECOVER, PARTIALLY OR FULLY, FROM 
THOSE ENTITIES FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM 
DISCHARGE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION, 
INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS. 
THUS, THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S PARTIAL 
WAIVER OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, UP TO THE AMOUNT 
OF THE DAMAGE CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 (1989), 
DOES NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE 
OPEN COURTS PROVISION IN ARTICLE I, § 11. 
Utah's open courts provision, Utah Const, article I, § 11, 
states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Co., 717 P.2d 670, 680 
(Utah 1985), this Court established a two-part test to determine 
whether a statute can limit or eliminate a common law right of 
action or remedy consistent with due process and the open courts 
provision. Although the open courts provision protects a person 
from being "arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to 
protect basic individual rights," id. at 675, it does not create 
new remedies or new rights of action that did not exist at common 
law. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 629; Brown v. Wicrhtman, 47 
Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 366-67 (1915). 
As noted above, an injured person had no common law right of 
action against, or remedy from, a governmental entity performing a 
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governmental function. See also Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 
589, 228 P. 213 (1924) (right to sue city for injuries caused by 
negligent repair of city street did not exist at common law and 
thus is only statutory). Since the adoption of the open courts 
provision worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, 
this Court has held, legislatively adopted sovereign immunity 
itself does not violate the open courts provision. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P. 2d at 629 (adopting the reasoning in Brown v. 
Wichita State Univ., 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24 (1976)); 
accord Neal v. Donahue, 611 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Okl. 1980); 
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 
(1957) (no remedy protected by open courts provision since 
government immune at common law for negligence occurring in the 
performance of a governmental function, such as maintenance of 
highways); see also Wright v. Colleton County School Distr., 301 
S.C. 282, 391 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1990) (open courts provision is not 
a guarantee of full compensation to all injured). As the courts in 
Madsen v. Borthick and Brown v. Wichita State University 
understood, a broad reading of the open courts provision as 
protecting rights or remedies that did not even exist when the 
constitution was adopted would prohibit retention of governmental 
immunity even for governmental functions. Brown, 547 P.2d at 1024. 
Under Madsen, a person injured in the course of a governmental 
entity's performance of a governmental function simply has no 
"right" that is constitutionally protected by the open courts 
provision from legislative infringement. 
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Without arguing that Madsen has been overruled, McCorvey 
maintains that after Condemarin it makes no difference, in 
analyzing his state constitutional challenges to the damage cap 
statute, whether a person's injury is incurred in a governmental 
entity's discharge of a nongovernmental function or a governmental 
function, as defined in Standiford v. Salt Lake Citv Corp,, 605 
P.2d 1230 (1980) and its progeny.13 (R. 3025, 3027, 3039, 3040, 
3044). If McCorvey were correct on this point, Condemarin 
effectively declared governmental immunity itself unconstitutional 
under the open courts provision. 
However, a majority of this Court in Condemarin never ruled 
that the damage cap statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
governmental functions for which the entity would have been immune 
at common law. As Justice Durham stated in the lead opinion, 
"there is no fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from 
governmental entities performing governmental functions." 
Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 342 (opinion of Durham, J.). 
Condemarin involved application of the damage cap to limit 
liability of the University Hospital for medical malpractice. 
Precisely because the operation of this hospital was not considered 
a governmental function, a majority concluded the Condemarin 
plaintiff had a common law right to recover from the governmental 
entity for negligently inflicted injuries, a right that was 
13Because McCorvey's cause of action arose prior to the 1987 
enactment of the statutory definition of "governmental function" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989), UDOT's references here to the 
term are to "governmental function" as defined by the case law. 
See Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp.. 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990). 
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infringed by the damage cap. Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 357-58) 
(opinion of Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.); ±d* at 372 
(opinion of Stewart, J.). And because the damage cap limited the 
right to unlimited recovery that existed at common law, Condemarin, 
775 P.2d at 356 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.)/ 
Justices Durham and Zimmerman determined that heightened 
constitutional scrutiny applied: "The opinion [in Berry1 
identified a special class of constitutional rights which are 
afforded protection under article I, section 11. Legislative 
attempts to abrogate those rights should be closely examined by 
this Court. . . . " JTd. at 358. "[B]ecause of the constitutional 
status of the right to a remedy for damage to one's person under 
article I, section 11, more [than a rational basis for the 
infringing legislation] is required." Ld. Accord id. at 368 
(concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J.) (because the interests at 
stake were specifically protected by the open courts provision, 
presumption of constitutionality shifted and the burden was on the 
state to justify any infringement). 
Justice Stewart agreed: "The right involved here is the right 
to a full remedy for a personal injury, a right protected by 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution . . . . The term 
'remedy,' as used in the open courts clause, means the full, fair, 
and complete remedy provided by the common law." Id. at 372 
(separate opinion of Stewart, J.) (emphasis added). Justice 
Stewart explained that a statute infringing a right protected by 
the open courts provision must be reviewed under a more stringent 
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standard of constitutionality than that applicable to "a 
nonconstitutional interest, such as a general social or economic 
interest." Jlci. at 370. Justice Stewart then stated the issue in 
Condemarin as whether the legislature had violated article I, 
section 24 "by limiting the liability of an institution owned by 
government which performs nongovernmental activities." Id., at 372 
(italics in original). Agreeing that the state's operation of 
University Hospital is not a governmental function in the 
constitutional sense, Justice Stewart succinctly described the line 
that governmental immunity demarcates between the constitutionally 
protected right of the Condemarin plaintiff, injured in the 
discharge of a nongovernmental function, and the nonconstitutional 
interest of McCorvey and others injured in a governmental entity's 
discharge of a governmental function: 
[T]he fStandiford test for governmental function] 
articulates the core value protected by governmental 
immunity—providing protection to the public treasury and 
tax revenues against overwhelming losses so that the 
essential functions of government will not be impaired. 
The test also identifies where the constitutional right 
of a person to have a remedy for personal injury begins 
under Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution as 
against a governmental agency, and where the governmental 
right to immunity from such lawsuits stops. 
Id. at 371-72. Chief Justice Hall and Justice Howe, in dissent, 
likewise clearly viewed the damage cap statute as nonviolative of 
the open courts provision when applied to government entities 
engaged in governmental functions. J[d. at 383 (dissenting opinion 
of Hall, C.J.). 
The continuing vitality of governmental immunity and the error 
in McCorvey's analysis of the various views expressed in Condemarin 
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are further evidenced by this Court's repeated application of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, after Condemarin, to immunize 
governmental entities performing governmental functions as defined 
by the Standiford test, unless that immunity has been waived by the 
legislature and the procedural requirements of the Act have been 
satisfied. E.g. , Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R,f 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 
(Utah 1992) (UDOT's immunity for decision re upgrading traffic 
control device not waived by Act); Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. 
Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990) (inspection and acceptance of 
subdivision improvements is governmental function for which 
immunity has not been waived by Act); Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) (city's 
construction, operation and maintenance of flood control system is 
a governmental function). 
As noted above, McCorvey has assumed that it makes no 
difference if a governmental entity is engaged in a governmental 
function. In the trial court, he expressly assumed that UDOT was 
performing a governmental function and stated the issue presented: 
"We are then balancing the constitutional right of access to the 
courts, open access to the courts, versus the state's right to 
protect the treasury, which is a nonconstitutional right." (R. 
3039). McCorvey never disputed that, in maintaining the 43,244 
miles of public highway system in Utah,1* UDOT or the other 
uUD0T Office of Policy and Systems Planning, Annual 
Statistical Summary, at 1 (Nov. 1991). The 5,793 miles of public 
highways (including interstates) maintained by UDOT constitutes 
only 13% of the total highway mileage, but accomodates 71% of the 
14.6 billion vehicle miles of travel each year. Id. 
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responsible governmental entity is performing a governmental 
function under the Standiford test,15 UDOT's duties in this regard 
are set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-7, -21, -86, -88(1). -95, 
96, and -104 (Supp. 1991), and 63-49-4 and -8(1)(a) (Supp. 1991). 
See also Utah Const, art. XIII, § 13 (revenues from highway user 
and motor fuel taxes are to be used exclusively for highway 
purposes, including construction and maintenance of city streets, 
county roads, and state highways). 
As Judge Murphy noted, this Court has recognized that a 
governmental entity's construction and maintenance of public 
roadways is such a governmental function. In Richards v. Leavitt, 
716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985), plaintiff sued for injuries suffered 
allegedly as the result of the city's negligent failure to maintain 
a traffic control device at the intersection of two public 
highways. In holding that the maintenance and repair of traffic 
signs is a governmental function under Standiford, this Court 
^Construction and maintenance of public roads by a 
governmental entity was consistently held to be an immunized 
governmental function under the test used by this Court before 
Standiford. e.g., Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 
1977); Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800, 802 
(1941); Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924); 
see also Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d at 1335-36 
(municipality would have been immune at common law for injuries 
suffered because of the defective or unsafe condition of a city 
steet); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975) (implicitly 
holds that State's planning and construction of highway is a 
governmental function, and expressly holds that immunity for that 
function was not retained by the discretionary function exception 
in section 63-30-10(1)); Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 
384, 496 P»2d 888 (1972) (implicitly holds that erection of traffic 
warning signs on state highway is a governmental function, and 
expressly holds that immunity not retained for the specific 
negligent act by section 63-30-10(1)). 
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pointed out that the categorization of maintenance of all public 
ways as a governmental function is inherent in the waiver of 
immunity in section 63-30-8 for injury caused by defective 
highways, streets and other public ways. jrd.. at 278; see Ingram v. 
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 127 (Utah 1987) (city has 
nondelegable duty to maintain city streets in reasonably safe 
condition); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1987) 
(same). 
Since there was no common law right of action to recover any 
compensation for personal injury from a governmental entity 
performing a governmental function, the damage cap in section 63-
30-34 does not infringe or take away any right of persons so 
injured that is protected by the open courts provision. 
Other states' statutory damage caps have withstood challenges 
under similar state constitutional provisions. In Cauley v. City 
of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379, 384-85 (Fla. 1981), plaintiffs sued 
for injuries suffered as a result of the city's negligent 
maintenance of a city roadway. The Florida Supreme Court upheld a 
$50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence limit on judgments 
against governmental entities for which the same statute waived 
immunity. Because there was no common law right to recover from 
the municipality in such a case, there could be no right to redress 
that was protected by the open courts provision. Accord Hale v. 
Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 783 P.2d 506, 511-12 (1989); Texas 
Dept. of Mental Health v. Petty, 817 S.W.2d 707, 721 (Tex. App. 
1991), application for writ of error granted March 4, 1992; 
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Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis.2d 823, 280 N.2d 711, 720 (1979). 
More recently, in State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992) 
(en banc), petition for cert, filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3829 (June 6, 
1992), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected an open courts challenge 
to the Colorado governmental immunity act's limited waiver of 
governmental immunity, up to the $150,000 per person/$400,000 per 
occurrence statutory cap. In a suit against the state highway 
department for negligent clearing of debris from a state road, the 
DeFoor court concluded that the state constitution's open courts 
provision only protected access to the courts for extant: rights of 
action to redress personal injury. Ld. at 790-91. 
In sum, McCorvey's only "right" to recover from UDOT for his 
injuries is that statutorily created action for limited damages 
authorized in the Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of 
immunity only up to the extent of the damage cap. See Leliefeld v. 
Johnson, 659 P.2d 111, 128-29 (Idaho 1983). Absent the 
infringement or deprivation of a right of action or remedy that is 
constitutionally protected by the open courts provision, it is 
inappropriate to apply the two-part Berry test to the challenged 
statute in this case. See Caulev, 403 So.2d at 385; DeFoor, 824 
P.2d at 791. 
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B. SECTION 63-30-34, WHICH IMPINGES NO SPECIALLY 
PROTECTED RIGHT BY LIMITING JUDGMENTS AGAINST 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES WHERE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
HAS BEEN STATUTORILY WAIVED, IS PRESUMPTIVELY 
CONSTITUTIONAL. McCORVEY HAS FAILED TO CARRY 
HIS BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE $250,000 DAMAGE 
CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 DENIES PERSONS INJURED 
IN THE COURSE OF A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY'S 
PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION RIGHTS 
PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, §§ 7 AND 24. 
Legislative enactments are generally afforded a strong 
presumption of constitutionality, Mt. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Garfield County. 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello 
v. Christensen, 788 P.2d at 516; State ex rel. Div. Consumer 
Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
The heavy burden of overcoming that presumption and proving a 
statute's invalidity is on the party challenging it. Greenwood v. 
City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). Mt. States 
Tel. & Tel. Co.. 811 P.2d at 187; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah 
v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); see also Rio Vista Oil. 
Ltd.. 786 P.2d at 1349-50. Presumptive constitutionality 
dissipates and the burden thereby shifts, requiring the opposing 
party to prove the constitutional validity of the challenged 
statute, only where it impinges on a fundamental or specially 
protected interest. See City of West Jordan v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd• . 767 P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 1988) (article I, § 24 
analysis); Rio Vista Oil Ltd.. 786 P.2d at 1350 (dictum re due 
process analysis); see also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring) (once infringement of interest protected by open 
courts provision is shown, burden of proving statute does not 
violate due process in article I, § 7 is on proponent of its 
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validity); id. at 363 (opinion of Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, 
J.) (due process analysis; state failed to make necessary showing 
of need for, and reasonableness of, damage cap). 
Unlike the Condemarin plaintiff, however, persons injured by 
a governmental entity performing a governmental function have no 
right to full recovery for personal injuries that is specially 
protected by the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
At most, an individual in this latter group has a statutorily 
created interest in recovering from the governmental entity only up 
to the amount of the damage cap. As Judge Murphy correctly ruled 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 02668), because this interest is neither 
a fundamental right nor a substantial one specifically protected by 
the constitution, the damage cap statute was presumed 
constitutional and the burden remained on McCorvey to prove its 
invalidity. 
McCorvey made no effort to carry his burden in the trial 
court. Instead, he merely asserted in his six-sentence legal 
argument that the damage cap is "unconstitutional" because 
seriously injured victims of governmental tortfeasors cannot 
recover all their actual damages, while other, less seriously 
injured victims of a governmental tortfeasor can (Plaintiffs 
Responsive Memorandum, R. 02605). McCorvey relied solely on his 
erroneous reading of Condemarin as shifting the burden of proof 
onto the State to satisfy the two-part Berry test (not applicable 
in this case) by demonstrating the damage cap's reasonableness 
under due process or equal protection analysis (id.; R. 3026-3031, 
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3040, 3043). 
Section 63-30-34 provides a reasonable method for protecting 
taxpayers and governmental entities' operating budgets and assets 
from unpredictable catastrophic losses caused in the performance of 
governmental functions and a figure on which future losses can be 
actuarially estimated and planned for. It establishes a rational 
limit on a governmental entity's liability that has been 
appropriately reached through competing interests' give and take in 
the democratic political process. It is the result of a 
legislative balancing of the desire to compensate with a realistic 
view of the taxing capacities of governmental units and the scope 
of potential governmental liability, in light of past actuarial 
experience and projected losses. 
In light of McCorvey's failure to go forward in the trial 
court with any evidence or relevant argument and analysis to 
support a contrary conclusion, i.e., that section 63-30-34 is 
unconstitutional under the applicable mode of analysis, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's conclusion that McCorvey failed to 
overcome the presumptive constitutionality of section 63-30-34.16 
On appeal, McCorvey should not be allowed to shift the burden 
16In the event this Court determines Judge Murphy erred in 
placing the burden of proof on McCorvey, and that the burden should 
be on UDOT to prove the statute's constitutionality, the 
appropriate remedy for his error is to remand this case for further 
proceedings on the issue of the statute's constitutionality. UDOT 
would then have an opportunity to go forward with its proof, such 
as the premium-setting and risk forecasting methods used by the 
actuaries at Risk Management, self-insurance and insurance costs 
and availability, catastrophic insurance unavailablity, and the 
claims history of state and local governmental entities. 
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of proving the damage cap statute's constitutionality to UDOT. See 
City of West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 537. Nonetheless, if this Court 
goes on to examine the merits of the constitutional claims that 
McCorvey merely asserts without applicable analysis, it will find 
that section 63-30-34 does not violate the due process or equal 
protection rights of persons injured during the discharge of a 
governmental function. 
C. THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL TORT 
VICTIMS CREATED BY THE DAMAGE CAP IN THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DO NOT VIOLATE THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE 
LAWS PROVISION. A FIXED CEILING ON 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES' LIABILITY, WHICH WILL 
NECESSARILY PRECLUDE FULL RECOVERY OF DAMAGES 
BY SOME PLAINTIFFS, IS REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF 
THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES SERVED BY 
THE ACT'S PARTIAL WAIVER OF ABSOLUTE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that "[a]11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
This provision has been interpreted as reflecting the "settled 
concern of the law that the legislature be restrained from the 
fundamentally unfair practice" of classifying persons in such a 
manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the 
purpose of the challenged law are treated differently by it, to the 
detriment of the complaining class. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d at 637 (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 
888). In examining a challenged statute for compliance with 
article I section 24, this court determines (1) whether the 
classification is reasonable; (2) whether the objectives of the 
legislative action are legitimate; and (3) whether there is a 
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reasonable relationship between the legislative classification and 
the legislative purposes• Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 637 P.2d at 
637; see Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-75 (Utah 1984). 
In applying this mode of equal protection analysis, general 
social or economic legislative enactments are given varying degrees 
of scrutiny depending on the nature of the complainant's affected 
interest. If the challenged statute impinges no fundamental right, 
or one that is specially protected by another state constitutional 
provision such as the open courts provision, the legislature must 
be given broad deference when this Court scrutinizes both the 
reasonableness of the legislative classifications and their 
relationship to legitimate legislative purposes. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 637. As this Court has stated, 
When considering challenges to matters of economic 
regulation that do not affect specially protected 
interests, we give deference to the legislature's 
judgment as to classifications needed to achieve the ends 
sought. To strike down such legislation, we must find 
that the means are not reasonably related to the 
achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose. 
City of West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 537 (citations omitted); see also 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 
83-84 (1978) (statutory cap on liability for nuclear plant 
accidents is a classic example of economic regulation to which 
rational basis test applies). Because those injured by 
governmental tortfeasors performing governmental functions have no 
constitutional or specially protected right to recover fully, or at 
all, from governmental entities, this deferential level of scrutiny 
is applicable to McCorvey's challenge to section 63-30-34. The 
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statute must accordingly be upheld under the uniform operation of 
the laws provision unless it is not reasonably related to the 
achievement of any conceivable, permissible legislative objective. 
See Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 779 P.2d at 637; Baker v. Matheson, 
607 P.2d 233, 244 (1979) (sustain legislative classifications if 
facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the disparate 
treatment); see also Rio Vista Oil, 786 P.2d at 1350. 
With regard to the first step of the test for article I 
section 24 compliance, McCorvey asserts on appeal, that section 63-
30-34 creates three unreasonable and therefore constitutionally 
impermissible classifications: (a) between victims of governmental 
tortfeasors and nongovernmental tortfeasors; (b) between victims of 
governmental negligence and victims of governmental takings; and 
(c) between plaintiffs granted the ability to sue the sovereign 
whose damages are less than the $250,000 cap, and those similarly 
situated whose damages exceed the cap. Only classification (c) was 
argued to the trial court. 
The first classification is created, not by the damage cap 
statute, but by the principle of sovereign immunity itself as 
embraced by the Governmental Immunity Act and then partially 
waived. See Hale, 783 P.2d at 516; Brown, 547 P.2d at 1029. 
McCorvey has neither claimed nor proven that governmental immunity 
for governmental functions violates any constitutional provision. 
Indeed, this Court has already held that the Governmental Immunity 
Act does not violate article I, section 24 by failing to completely 
waive absolute immunity for injuries arising from the performance 
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of all governmental functions, Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1978); see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363 (opinion of 
Durham, J.) (rejecting "extreme position" that naked existence of 
governmental immunity violates equal protection). 
The Colorado Supreme Court also rejected a head-on state equal 
protection challenge to governmental immunity that was aimed at the 
statutory damage cap for injuries arising out of governmental 
functions. Concluding there was no statutory infringement on a 
fundamental right, the court held that the statutory classification 
granting only limited recovery to victims of governmental 
tortfeasors had a reasonable basis in fact and was reasonably 
related to the legitimate governmental objective of providing 
fiscal certainty in carrying out the manifold responsibilities of 
government. Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 226-27 
(Colo. 1986). 
The statutory classification limiting the amounts 
recoverable against a public entity is based on real 
differences in fact between governmental and private 
tortfeasors. Public entities are responsible for 
providing a vast array of governmental services to the 
public and, as a result, are exposed to far greater 
liability and risks than a private individual. Moreover, 
the public entity, unlike the private individual, does 
not have the option of declaring bankruptcy or going out 
of business when subjected to tort liability, but rather 
must continue to carry out its responsibility to the 
public. The legislative decision to limit the public 
entity's liability . . . therefore, proceeds from actual 
differences in the magnitude and character of the 
functions assumed by public entities and in the effect of 
greater potential liability exposure on the public 
entity's ability to continue its governmental functions. 
Id. at 227. Lee was recently reaffirmed in State v. DeFoor, 824 
P.2d 783, 787 (Colo. 1992), which held that the legislature could, 
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consistent with the state and federal equal protection guarantees, 
statutorily waive governmental immunity for the maintenance of 
public highways while simultaneously limiting that recovery to a 
fixed dollar amount. The DeFoor court concluded that the damage 
cap was rationally related to the legitimate state interests of 
fiscal solvency and provision of essential services while 
minimizing taxpayer burden that would result from unforeseeable and 
unlimited tort judgments. Id. at 790; see Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 
372 (opinion of Stewart, J.) (value protected by governmental 
immunity is to provide "protection to the public treasury and tax 
revenues against overwhelming losses so that the essential 
functions of government will not be imperiled"). 
In short, as long as absolute governmental immunity can be 
legislatively retained without violating article I, section 24, 
Madsen v. State, 583 P. 2d at 94, the first challenged 
classification created by the Governmental Immunity Act's adoption 
and then partial waiver of that immunity is not unreasonable. 
DeFoor, 824 P. 2d at 795 (Rovira, J. concurring); Seifert v. 
Standard Paving Co. , 64 111.2d 109, 355 N.E.2d 537, 539 (1976), 
overruled on other grounds, Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of 
Claims, 109 111.2d 72, 485 N.E.2d 332 (1985); Winston v. 
Reorganized School Distr. R-2, 636 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. 1982); 
Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1986), appeal 
dismissed, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987); see also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 
388 n.70 (Hall, C.J., dissenting) (since legislature could retain 
absolute immunity for torts inflicted during discharge of 
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governmental function without violating state equal protection 
guarantee, legislature can also constitutionally limit recovery 
where immunity has been partially waived). 
McCorvey's second classification raises an equal protection 
argument never presented or argued in the trial court. For that 
reason, it should not even be addressed on the merits in this 
appeal. Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 413 
(Utah 1990). In any event, section 63-30-34(3)'s exception of 
governmental takings of private property for public use from the 
$250,000 damage cap is merely reflective of this Court's holding 
that inverse condemnation suits are not subject to common law 
governmental immunity principles or to the Governmental Immunity 
Act and that article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is 
self-executing. Farmer's New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful 
City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.l (Utah 1990); Colman v. Utah State 
Land Bd. , 795 P.2d 622, 630-35 (Utah 1990). Thus, the second 
classification complained of by McCorvey is created by article I, 
section 22 of the Utah Constitution itself, not by the challenged 
statute. 
The third classification McCorvey asserts is unreasonable is 
that between persons with damages less than the statutory liability 
limit and those whose damages exceed it. This argument was 
rejected in Seifert, 355 N.E.2d at 541, in which the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that, since the legislature had created the 
right of action of victims of government torts, it could set a 
maximum amount recoverable in that action without violating equal 
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protection. 
With regard to those persons injured in the exercise of a 
governmental function, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act creates no 
deprivations. Instead, it grants a benefit equally by giving all 
such persons the ability to sue a governmental entity where no such 
action would otherwise exist. All governmental tort victims are 
likewise equally subject to section 63-30-34's limit on recoverable 
damages. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in the State's 
consenting to be sued for otherwise immune activity only up to a 
fixed amount. On the contrary, such a limit (which is, in effect, 
a legislative retention of immunity for an individual's damages 
greater than $250,000) is eminently rational in light of the 
magnitude and nature of the essential functions of government, 
their concomitant huge potential for governmental liability, and 
the effects of unlimited liability on the government's ability to 
budget with some degree of certainty and to perform these functions 
with available revenues. Thus, the classification necessarily 
created by a damage cap of any amount is not an unreasonable one. 
Although not well articulated, McCorvey seems to be contending 
that, once immunity is waived, any damage cap is per se 
unreasonable. In other words, "If I don't get to recover all my 
damages from a governmental entity, then other victims of 
governmental torts whose damages are less than $250,000 cannot 
constitutionally be allowed to recover all their damages either." 
Under such a view, the legislature can satisfy the uniform 
operation of the laws provision only by choosing between the 
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extreme options of absolute immunity or absolute liability. This 
position is not only unsupportable as a matter of constitutional 
law, it also constitutes bad public policy. 
Forced to choose between retention of absolute liability and 
adoption of unlimited liability for injuries arising from 
governmental functions, the legislature would inevitably choose the 
former so governmental entities could budget with enough certainty 
to continue providing essential services, such as maintenance of 
public roads, police protection, firefighting, and prison 
operation. This would result in no compensation for any person 
injured in the government's discharge of a governmental function, 
putting us back in the same position we were in in 1965, which the 
Governmental Immunity Act was expressly intended to rectify. In 
choosing partial waiver of absolute immunity, only up to $250,000, 
the legislature has created a classification that is not a 
discrimination "with no rational basis," Mountain States Legal Fdn. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1055 (Utah 1981), in light 
of the constitutional permissibility of governmental immunity 
itself and the Governmental Immunity Act's purposes. 
McCorvey does not demonstrate how the statutory 
classifications, even if reasonable, nonetheless fail the second 
and third parts of the applicable equal protection test, either 
because the objectives of the legislative action are illegitimate 
or because there is no reasonable relationship between the 
legislative classification and the legislative purposes. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield, 637 P.2d at 637. 
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The Governmental Immunity Act is designed, and was 
deliberately intended, to balance two competing interests: the 
compensation of many victims of governmental tortfeasors who would 
otherwise have no recourse if the governmental entity was engaged 
in a governmental function, and the preservation of the public 
treasury from unpredictable, devastating judgments so that 
essential services can continue being provided. The damage cap 
serves these purposes and at the same time provides governmental 
entities with the ability to plan for and pay for government 
expenditures, which was also a major concern of the 1965 
legislature. See Kennedy & Lynch, "Some Problems of a Sovereign 
Without Immunity," 36 So. Ca. L. Rev. 161, 177-78 (1963). Only in 
this way could the legislature open the door, but not all the way, 
as the Act's proponents intended. 
The need to preserve the public treasury and the need for a 
reasonable degree of fiscal certainty in risk management and 
budgeting for governmental functions without undue tax burdens are 
the legitimate purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act's partial 
waiver of absolute immunity only up to the damage cap in section 
63-30-34. DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790; Lee, 718 P.2d at 226-27; 
Stanhope, 280 N.W.2d at 719; Wilson, 753 P.2d at 1351-52. By 
limiting the liability of a public entity to a fixed amount, the 
Governmental Immunity Act "protects the public entity against the 
risk that unlimited and unforeseen judgments will deplete the 
public coffers and result in the termination or substantial 
curtailment of important governmental functions." DeFoor, 824 P.2d 
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at 790.17 As the Missouri Supreme Court has pointed out, the 
legislature has a rational basis to fear that full monetary 
responsibility for any and all tort claims entails the risk of 
insolvency or intolerable tax burdens. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328. 
Limiting recovery allows for "fiscal and actuarial planning 
consonant with orderly stewardship of governmental funds," id., 
while permitting some recovery. 
The same conclusion about the legitimacy of the legislative 
purposes behind statutory damage caps on the liability of 
governmental entities performing governmental functions has been 
reached by numerous other courts that have likewise rejected state 
and/or federal equal protection challenges to them. E.g., Caulev, 
403 So.2d at 387 ($50,000 cap); Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 
399 So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla. App.), review denied, 411 So.2d 383 (Fla. 
1981) ($50,000 cap); Packard v. Joint School Distr., 104 Idaho 604, 
661 P.2d 770 (App. 1983) ($100,000 cap); Estate of Caraill v. 
Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704, 706-08 ($50,000 cap), appeal 
dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1979); Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 
867 (Minn. 1988) ($100,000 cap); Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349, 
1352-53 (Okla. 1988) ($25,000 cap); Hale v. Portland, 308 Or. 508, 
783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989) ($100,000 cap); Lvles v. Philadelphia, 88 
Pa. Cmwlth. 509, 490 A.2d 936, 941 ($250,000 cap), aff'd, 512 Pa. 
322, 516 A.2d 701 (1985); Wright v. Colleton County School Distr., 
391 S.E.2d at 570 ($250,000 cap); Texas Dept. of Mental Health v. 
17These are, of course, the same legitimate purposes served by 
the doctrine of governmental immunity itself. Condemarin, 775 at 
371-72 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
64 
Petty, 817 S.W.2 at 721) ($250,000 cap); Stanhope, 280 N.2d at 719 
($25,000); Sambs v. Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504, 514 
($25,000 cap), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); contra Pfost v. 
State, 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495, 504-05 (1985) (conservation of 
public coffers not compelling state interest; result distinguished 
as flowing from Montana constitution's rejection of governmental 
immunity, in Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 381 n.39 (Hall, C.J., 
dissenting)) .18 
The reasonableness of the means chosen in section 63-30-34 to 
achieve these purposes, i.e., the third part of the applicable 
equal protection test, is addressed in the next section as part of 
the due process analysis. 
D. THE DAMAGE CAP, IN A NONARBITRARY AMOUNT 
REACHED THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, IS 
REASONABLY RELATED TO THE LEGITIMATE GOAL OF 
COMPENSATING MOST VICTIMS OF GOVERNMENTAL 
TORTFEASORS WHILE STILL PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
TREASURY FROM THE RISKS OF UNLIMITED LIABILITY 
AND PROVIDING A REASONABLE BASIS FOR FISCAL 
PLANNING AND RISK MANAGEMENT. 
McCorvey contends that section 63-30-34's denial of full 
compensation to governmental tort victims with damages greater than 
$250,000 is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relationship to the 
Act's purposes. Thus, he claims in his one paragraph of argument, 
the statute violates the due process guarantee in article I, 
section 7, which provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." Since the 
18See generally Anno.# "Validity and Construction of Statute 
or Ordinance Limiting the Kinds or Amount of Actual Damages 
Recoverable in Tort Action Agamrt Governmental Unit," 43 A.L.R.4th 
19, 29-34 (1986) and (Supp. 19^1). 
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Governmental Immunity Act deprives McCorvey and other similarly 
situated plaintiffs of nothing, but instead only grants to all such 
persons equally the ability to sue and recover up to $250,000, 
there has been no deprivation triggering any but the most 
deferential due process scrutiny. 
To the extent the legislature may not enact economic or social 
legislation that creates remedies limited in some cases by 
irrational or arbitrary line-drawing, a statutory damage cap is a 
rational means of achieving the legitimate purposes of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, and this particular $250,000 cap is not 
arbitrary. See Lee, 718 P.d at 228; Jetton, 399 So.2d at 399; 
Packard, 661 P.2d at 775. McCorvey has failed to carry his burden 
of overcoming the statute's presumptive constitutionality by 
proving the contrary. 
As noted above, a damage cap is the only rational way to serve 
the competing purposes of the Utah Legislature's partial waiver of 
absolute governmental immunity for governmental functions. A fixed 
limit of liability at $250,000 is large enough to compensate most 
injured persons and serve the deterrent function of tort liability, 
while simultaneously protecting the public treasury from the risk 
of insolvency or unfeasible tax burdens that would result from 
catastrophic judgments. As the recent earthquake in San Francisco, 
floods in Chicago, and riots in Los Angeles demonstrate, there is 
already a hampered ability to predict the numbers of claims that 
will arise out of a governmental entity's efforts at flood 
management, bridge repair, and police protection, all governmental 
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functions. 
A damage cap provides a crucial element of needed certainty. 
It supplies a fixed amount on which to estimate future liability 
based on the best estimate of numbers of claims, thereby enabling 
governments to budget for the costs of self-insurance. In this 
way, it comprises a central part of the state's risk management 
program. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, risk 
management "requires that recovery be restricted at some finite 
level so that risk exposure can be projected and informed 
underwriting decisions can be made." Packard, 661 P.2d at 775. 
Yearly actuarial studies establish the maximum cost of liability 
for the next year, based on past loss experience and any visible 
trends in the numbers and types of claims filed, using the 
assumption that no claim will cost more than the $250,000 limit. 
Without a fixed dollar cap to cut off unlimited liability and 
define the actuary's worst case scenario, there is no way to 
project future losses realistically. In short, with no cap in 
place, budgeting for self-insurance and all other government 
expenditures could not be done with any tolerable level of 
certainty. 
The legislative history of 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130 shows clearly 
that the amount of Utah's current cap, far from being arbitrary, 
was reached through the difficult political process by compromises 
between competing interests. Utah's cap is, in fact, $15,000 
above the average of current statutory limits on governmental 
entity liability in states whose legislatures have similarly acted 
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to partially waive immunity only up to a fixed dollar amount.19 
Deciding whether to give up sovereign immunity and, if so, 
whether and where to draw the line of maximum recovery is not a 
judicial function. As numerous courts have pointed out, it is the 
role of the legislature, not the courts, 
to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure to 
liability, the need to compensate citizens for injury, 
the availability of and cost of insurance, and the 
financial condition of the governmental units. It is the 
legislature's function to structure statutory provisions, 
which will protect the public interest in reimbursing the 
victim and in maintaining government services and which 
will be fair and reasonable to the victim and at the same 
time will be realistic regarding the financial burden to 
be placed on the taxpayers. 
Sambs. 293 N.W.2d at 514; accord Leliefeld, 659 P.2d at 129; 
Stanhope, 280 N.W. 2d at 719. In short, it is not the province of 
the judiciary to second-guess elected officials' weighing of 
competing interests and their resolution of the difficult policy 
19Ala. Code § 11-93-2 (1975) ($100,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-
10-114 (1988) ($150,000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4012 (Supp. 
1990) ($300,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.28(5) (West Supp. 1992) 
($100,000); Idaho Code § 6-926 (1984) ($500,000 per occurrence); 
111. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1990) ($100,000); 
Ind. Code. Ann. §34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) ($300,000); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 75-6105 (1989) ($500,000 per occurrence); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000); Me. Rev. Stat, titl 14, § 
8105 (West 1964) ($300,000 per occurrence); Md. Code Ann. § 5-399.2 
(Supp. 1991) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988) ($100,000); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
466.04 (Supp. 1992) ($200,000); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-15 (Supp. 
1991) ($25,000 until July 1, 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.035 
(Supp. 1991) ($50,000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (Michie 1989) 
($300,000); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); 
Okla. Stat. Ann. titl 51, § 154 (West Supp. 1992) ($100,000); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 30.270 (1991) ($100,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
8557 (1982) ($500,000); R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Tex. Civ. Prac. 
& Rem. Code Ann. § 101.023 (West 1986) ($250,000); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 893.82(6) (West Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-118 
(Supp. 1991) ($250,000). 
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questions underlying a partial waiver of absolute governmental 
immunity up to a fixed dollar amount. See Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at 
512; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 377, 385, (Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
Finally, section 63-30-34 is not arbitrary merely because it 
precludes full recovery by those who, like McCorvey, are the most 
seriously injured. Any damage cap will do so, precisely because it 
is intended to do so. A cap high enough not to exclude any member 
of this group from full recovery would, in fact, be no cap at all. 
In rejecting a federal due process challenge to a statutory 
liability limit for injuries arising from operation of nuclear 
power plants, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of necessity, 
be arbitrary in the sense that any choice of a figure 
based on imponderables like those at issue here can 
always be so characterized. This is not, however, the 
kind of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise 
constitutional action. 
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoted in DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790 
n.12. 
Likewise, Utah's recovery limit is not arbitrary, in the state 
constitutional due process sense, and it is reasonably related to 
achieving the Act's legitimate purposes. As the legislative 
history of the 1965 Governmental Immunity Act documents, partial 
waiver of immunity is the result of the legislature's balancing of 
the needs for essential, costly government services and reasonable 
tax limits with the perceived need for some compensation of injured 
tort claimants. Numerous other courts have also concluded, in 
rejecting state due process or equal protection challenges to 
similar statutes, that there is a rational relationship between a 
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damage cap and the legitimate purposes behind partial waivers of 
absolute governmental immunity for some or all governmental 
functions. In addition to the cases cited above under equal 
protection analysis, see DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790; Leliefeld, 659 
P.2d at 128; Packard, 661 P.2d at 775; Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at 514; 
Stanhope, 280 N.W.2d at 719; Wright, 391 S.E.2d at 570. 
For these reasons, UDOT requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's ruling that McCorvey has failed to prove that section 
63-30-34 violates equal protection or due process guaranteed by the 
Utah Constitution. 
B. McCORVEY'S CLAIM THAT THE DAMAGE CAP VIOLATES 
HIS ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT 
RAISED BELOW AND IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ON 
APPEAL. IN ANY EVENT, THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL 
DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ACTION, SUCH AS THIS ONE, 
THAT WAS NOT MAINTAINABLE AT COMMON LAW. IF 
APPLICABLE, THERE IS NO DENIAL OF THE RIGHT 
PROTECTED BY SECTION 10 BECAUSE THE JURY IS 
PERMITTED TO FIND THE FACTS AND ASSESS 
DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 63-30-34. 
McCorvey asserts that the damage cap violates his right to 
jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution. This claim should not be addressed on appeal because 
it was never raised in the trial court. Espinal, 797 P.2d at 413. 
In addition, McCorvey's brief on appeal provides completely 
inadequate analysis and supporting authority for his constitutional 
claim, which is an alternative reason for refusing to address the 
issue. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
On the merits, this claim should be rejected. Section 10 
does not create rights or remedies any more than the open courts 
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provision in section 11 does. The right to jury trial in section 
10 applies only to cases cognizable at common law when our 
constitution was adopted. Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mt. 
Irrigation. 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990). Here, section 63-30-34 
cannot violate the section 10 right to jury trial where there would 
have been no right of action at all at common law against a 
governmental entity discharging a governmental function. Seifert. 
355 N.E.2d at 541. Furthermore, the damage cap in section 63-30-34 
merely sets the outer limits of a governmental tort victim's remedy 
in a legislatively created cause of action. It does not deny 
access to the courts, and it does not prevent the jury from finding 
the facts and assessing a plaintiff's damages, which is the crux of 
the right to jury trial. Wright, 391 S.E.2d at 569-70; Bovd v. 
Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, section 63-30-34 does 
not deny plaintiffs in McCorvey's circumstances a right to jury 
trial protected by article I, section 10. 
F. IF THE DAMAGE CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 IS HELD 
VIOLATIVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THIS COURT 
MUST ALSO INVALIDATE THE BALANCE OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, INCLUDING THE 
WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY IN SECTIONS 63-30-8 AND 
-10, AS NOT SEVERABLE FROM SECTION 63-30-34. 
WITHOUT A VALID STATUTORY WAIVER OF ABSOLUTE 
COMMON LAW IMMUNITY FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT 
OF THE PERFORMANCE OF A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION, 
PLAINTIFF McCORVEY CAN RECOVER NOTHING FROM 
UDOT, AND THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST UDOT 
MUST BE VACATED ACCORDINGLY. 
If the Court accepts McCorvey's constitutional arguments based 
on Condemarin and holds that section 63-30-34 violates the Utah 
Constitution by limiting recovery by a person injured as a result 
of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental function, 
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the Court must next consider the issue of severability. 
Where part of an enactment is unconstitutional, the 
severability question is primarily answered by determining 
legislative intent. Berry, 717 P.2d at 687 (Utah 1985); Salt Lake 
City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 
(Utah 1977). To do so, the appellate court asks whether the 
balance of the enactment, other than the portion struck down, can 
stand alone and serve its legitimate legislative purpose. Utah 
Technology Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986); 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 687; State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
In this case, the Governmental Immunity Act legislatively 
adopted governmental immunity, then waived that immunity in some 
circumstances but capped the liability at a dollar limit. The 
statute was designed to waive immunity only partially by creating 
a limited cause of action. It is apparent from this structure of 
the Act itself, and from its legislative history, supra at pages 
32-38, that the damage cap in section 63-30-34 is an integral part 
of this enactment and is, therefore, not severable. Salt Lake City 
v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791. It is 
indisputable that the Utah Legislature would not have enacted the 
Governmental Immunity Act and created a cause of action against 
governmental entities performing governmental functions (in 
sections 63-30-8 and -10) if, in doing so, it were subjecting 
governmental entities to unlimited liability. See Berry, 717 P.2d 
at 686 (entire Utah Product Liability Act struck down as 
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inseverable where section setting forth statute of repose 
invalidated as constitutional). The waiver of immunity and damage 
cap provisions were enacted as a package and are inextricably 
interrelated. In such a circumstance, "it is not within the scope 
of the court's function to select the valid portions of the act and 
make conjecture the legislature intended they should stand 
independent of the portions which are invalid." Salt Lake City v. 
International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791. 
In any event, the legislative history of the Governmental 
Immunity Act rules out any such conjecture. The Utah Legislature 
plainly did not intend that a plaintiff in McCorvey's position 
could have the benefits of the Act's waiver provisions without also 
being subject to the recovery limitations in section 63-30-34. 
Standing alone, the waiver of immunity portions of the Act cannot 
stand independently and serve the legislature's purposes. Berry, 
111 P.2d at 688. Accordingly, the balance of the Act must be 
struck down if this Court holds that the Utah Legislature irw**: not, 
consistent with the Utah Constitution, prohibit one injured in the 
course of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental 
function from recovering, in a statutorily created right of action, 
all the damages attributed by the jury to the responsible entity. 
Without any valid statutory waiver of governmental immunity 
and statutory creation of a right of action, McCorvey's ability to 
sue or recover from UDOT in this case is controlled by the common 
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the relevant case law, 
supra at pages 39-46, there is no right of action to recover 
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anything from a governmental entity for injuries arising out of 
public highway maintenance, a governmental function. Accordingly, 
the judgment entered in this case against UDOT must be vacated, and 
McCorvey should take nothing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above in Part II, sections A-E, UDOT 
requests that this Court affirm the judgment below and hold that, 
in limiting the personal injury liability of a governmental entity 
discharging a governmental function, the $250,000 per person damage 
cap in section 63-30-34 does not violate any of the enumerated 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. On the other hand, if the 
Court concludes that section 63-30-34 is invalid because a 
statutory dollar limit on the damages recoverable from a 
governmental entity, even one performing a governmental function, 
violates any provision of the Utah Constitution, the Governmental 
Immunity Act should be struck down in its entirety as inseverable 
from section 63-30-34, and the judgment against UDOT vacated 
accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted this l4H* day of July, 1992. 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Utah Attorney General 
Annina M. Mitchell (2274) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for UDOT 
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ADDENDA 
ATJENDUM A 
63-30-34. Limit of judgment against governmental* entity 
or employee. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov-
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in 
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occur-
rence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of 
whether or not the function giv:ng rise to the injury is characterized as gov-
ernmental. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage 
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity 
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court 
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
ADDENDUM B 
David R. Olsen, Esq. (#2458) 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. (#4691) 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant McCorvey 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAUN PAUL PAGE, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY; STATE OF ] 
UTAH; LeGRAND JOHNSON CON- ; 
STRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and P. WAYNE 
WRIGHT, 
Defendants. 
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION and LeGRAND 
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. ] 
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I MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT 
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i Civil No. C87-4304 
I Civil No. C88-1818 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
LeGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
P. WAYNE WRIGHT, individually, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. 
INTRODUCTION 
The State of Utah (herein "State") has objected to 
the form of the judgment claiming that its damages are limited 
to $250,000 by Utah Code Annotated S 63-30-34(1). The damage cap 
has been declared unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) 
(Exhibit "A" hereto). According to the Condemarin Court, the 
statutory damage cap is unconstitutional because it denies the 
seriously injured plaintiff equal access to the courts and it is 
violative of Article I, Sections 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
TACTS 
1. The State contracted with LeGrand Johnson Con-
struction Company (herein "Contractor") to chip seal Interstate-
15 near Cove Port, Utah. 
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2. The contract required the Contractor to provide 
a traffic control plan for the project. (Exhibit "BH hereto). 
3. The Contractor failed to provide a traffic control 
plan for this project. Instead, the Contractor accepted a plan 
which the State had on file, but only after it had reviewed and 
commented on the plan. (Testimony of H. Paul Johnson). 
4. The Contract also required the Contractor to main-
tain public liability insurance which was in force and applicable 
to this project. A copy of its insurance policy had to be pro-
vided to the State prior to the award of the Contract. (Exhibit 
"C" hereto). 
5. The contract likewise required the Contractor 
to indemnify the State for injuries or damages to the public 
resulting from the Contractor's neglect. An indemnity provision 
exists in this instance because the Contract speficially incor-
porated the Special Provisions which in turn incorporated by 
reference the State of Utah's Standard Specifications for Road 
and Bridge Construction wherein an indemnity provision is con-
tained in § 107.14. The Contract, Special Provisions and § 107.14 
of the Standard Specifications are attached hereto as Exhibits 
"D" through "F". 
6. Daniel McCorvey's actual injuries exceed the stat-
utory cap by $3,671,282. Interrogatory V, Special Verdict. 
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I. 
THE STATUTORY CAP IS WCQFSTITVTCTAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared the statutory cap 
unconstitutional. Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 
348 (Utah 1989). The Condemarin Court ruled that the statute 
deprived the severely injured from open access to the courts, 
pursuant to Art. I# SS 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution. The 
Utah Supreme Court reasoned in Condemarin that the cap created 
an impermissible distinction between victims of governmental 
tortfeasors: 
[T]he recovery cap created a distinction 
between victims of governmental tortfeasors, 
depending on the severity of their injuries: 
the mildly injured received all; the moder-
ately injured, most; and the severely injured, 
only a fraction or none of their economic 
and/or non-economic damages. 
775 P.2d at 353. 
Applying a balancing test in Condemarin. the Supreme 
Court ruled that the governmental interest in limiting its liabil-
ity paled in light of the importance of the individual right 
being compromised — the right to compensation for severe in-
juries. Under this balancing test, the Court held that the statu-
tory cap which caused a limited few to bear alone the burden of 
significant injuries was unconstitutional. 
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II. 
THE RATIONALE FOR A STATUTORY CAP 
MAKES NO SENSE IN THIS CASE, 
The unfairness of an argument for a statutory cap is 
clearly evidenced by this case. The Contract required the Con-
tractor to provide a traffic control plan. It also required 
the Contractor to maintain insurance. Despite these specific 
mandates, the State decided to participate in the process and 
submitted a totally inadequate plan. Had the State honored its 
Contract and required the Contractor to perform as written, Daniel 
McCorvey would have been fully compensated. The Contractor has 
adequate insurance to pay the verdict. Instead, the State argues 
that because it negligently involved itself in the traffic control 
plan, Daniel McCorvey should remain uncompensated for his actual 
damages. There is no logic or reason to such a position. The 
State acted as a volunteer and did something that a private party 
was clearly obligated to do and had agreed to do by Contract. 
The seriously injured McCorvey should not be deprived of his 
remedy because of the unnecessary meddling of the State. There 
is no clear social or economic evil which needs to be eliminated 
at Daniel McCorvey's expense. 
This case also illustrates the potential for the man-
ipulation of a victim's recovery. As argued during the trial, 
the State's apparent willingness to accept responsibility for 
- 5 -
the Contractor's actions must be viewed as an artifice to deprive 
Daniel McCorvey of compensation• Liability is shifted from the 
Contractor who can pay, to the State who can assert a liability 
cap defense to a just verdict. This reduces the amount which the 
Contractor must pay as indemnity to Daniel McCorvey's detriment. 
Such a result highlights the valid concerns of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Condemarin. The burden of protecting the State's trea-
sury and the Contractor's insurance carrier falls exclusively 
on those most in need of protection — the severely injured* 
CONTUSION 
Section 63-30-34 is unconstitutional. There is no basis 
to reduce the award of damages to Daniel McCorvey. 
DATED this 'f^""day of December, 1990. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
DAVID R: OLSEN, Esq. 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff McCorvey 
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ADDENDUM C 
Tfcird J'jdiCjaJ District 
DEC 1 0 1990 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VAUN PAUL PAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY; STATE OF 
UTAH; LEGRAND JOHNSON CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and P. WAYNE 
WRIGHT, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
CASE NO. C-87-4304 
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION and LEGRAND 
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff has submitted a form of judgment and the 
defendants have objected to the form. A hearing was conducted 
on the objection and the court resolved on the record all 
issues relating to interest. The court, however, took under 
advisement the question of the applicability of the statutory 
PAGE V. MCCORVEY PAGE TWO SUMMARY DECISION 
cap of $250,000 on damage judgments against the State of Utah. 
On the evening of November 21, 1990, the jury returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff of $5,421,282 and found that the 
relative fault of the State was 28% of the total. Under normal 
circumstances, the State would thereby be liable for just 
over $1.5 million of the total verdict. The State, however, 
asserts that Section 63-30-34(1), Utah Code Ann., applies and 
maximizes its liability at $250,000.00. Plaintiff contends 
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Condemarin v. University 
Hospital. 775 P2d 348 (Utah 1989) renders the statutory cap 
unconstitutional as it applies to this case. This court, then, 
must determine the applicability of the Condemarin case to the 
verdict in the instant case. 
There were three opinions in Condemarin which held the 
statutory cap unconstitutional. The lead opinion of Justice 
Durham expressly limited the applicability of the result. 
Justice Durham stated: 
[T]he holding of the Court is 
limited to the following: the 
recovery limits statutes are 
unconstitutional as applied to 
the University Hospital. 775 
P2d at 366. 
/*' rri 
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Three of the four separate opinions in Condemarin expressly 
acknowledged that the common law at the time of the Utah 
Constitution incorporated the principle of sovereign immunity. 
775 P2d at 349, 351, 370-71, 383. Two of the three opinions of 
the majority, however, focused on the proposition that only 
governmental functions, as distinguished from proprietary 
functions, were immune. 775 P2d at 351-52, 370-71. It would 
appear, then, that the majority viewed the opportunity for 
recovery by a person injured by the government in the exercise 
of proprietary or nonessential government functions as a 
fundamental right. It furthermore appears that **he majority 
perceived the governme- activities before it, the operation of 
University Hospital, as nonessential government services and 
thus treated the plaintiff's right to recover as a substantial 
or fundamental right. 775 P2d at 351-52, 370-71. 
Because the majority was so focused on limiting its ruling 
to the activities of University Hospital, it is necessary for 
this court to determine whether the plaintiff's right to 
recover against the government is a fundamental right. 
Correspondingly, it is necessary for this court to determine 
whether the State's activities in this case were essential 
governmental functions or what have traditionally been labeled 
proprietary functions. 
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The activities challenged in the instant case, road 
maintenance, are ones which have been traditionally immune as 
essential governmental functions. See Richards v. Leavitt. 716 
P2d 276 (Utah 1985) and cases cited therein. The government is 
thus liable for damages in connection with its road maintenance 
activities only if the government waives immunity. As a 
consequence, the right of the plaintiff in this case to recover 
against the government, as distinguished from the right of the 
plaintiff in Condemarin, is not a fundamental right. The 
constitutional analysis of Condemarin is therefore 
inapplicable. Not only is the constitutional analysis in 
Condemarin inapplicable, two of the opinions of the majority 
suggest that, in a case such as this involving the performance 
of governmental functions, there is no right to unlimited 
recovery. 775 P2d at 352, 371-72. 
This court, then, is left with an indication that the 
statutory cap is applicable to this plaintiff's recovery 
against the government in its performance of essential 
governmental functions. Plaintiff's contentions must also be 
considered in light of the presumptive constitutionality of the 
challenged statute and the need to resolve any doubt in 
PAGE V. MCCORVEY PAGE FIVE SUMMARY DECISION 
favor of constitutionality, Timpanoaos Planning & Water 
Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 
P2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 
Ind. 520, 530, 418 N.E. 2d 207, 213-14 (1981). 
For the foregoing reasons, the provisions of Section 
63-30-34(1), Utah Code Ann., are applicable to the verdict and 
reduce the recovery against the State of Utah to $250,000.00. 
The court reached this conclusion before the close of business 
on Friday, December 7, 1990 and signed and entered a judgment 
consistent with this decision. 
Dated this f 0 day of December, 1990. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM D 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
H. J. R. No. 21. (Passed March 14, 1963.) 
A Joint Resolution of the 35th Legislature of the State of Utah Making 
an Assignment to the Utah Legislative Council to Study Waiver of 
Governmental Immunity from Suit and Consent of the State and its 
Political Subdivisions to be Liable for the Torts of Their Agents; 
Providing for a Committee Appointed by the Council and Requesting 
an Appropriation for the Study. 
Be it resolved by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
WHEREAS, the State of Utah, including its political subdivisions, 
is generally immune from suit having waived its immunity only with 
respect to specific kinds of actions, and 
WHEREAS, governmental immunity from suit may result in hard-
ship to persons who may be injured or whose property may be dam-
aged, and 
WHEREAS, it is desirable to investigate and study the experience 
of other states and of various proposals for a waiver of immunity and 
permitting consent to liability for torts of agents, 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Legislative Coun-
cil investigate and study the effects upon the state and its political sub-
divisions of waiver of immunity from suit and consent to be liable for 
the torts of their officers, employees and agents, together with the 
most workable statutes and procedures for carrying out such legislation 
and to make recommendations to the 36th Legislature. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Legislative Council appoint 
a committer to assist with the study of not to exceed twenty-five mem-
bers, *to inciude at least two members recommended by the Governor, 
two members appointed by the President of the Senate, two members 
appointed by the Speaker of the House, two members of the Utah 
Municipal League, two members of the County Officers' Association, 
two members representing the Public School Districts, two members 
of Special Improvement Districts, two representatives from the Utah 
State Bar, and the remaining members citizens at large. Not less than 
one-third of the membership of the committee shall be members of the 
state legal profession. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Legislative Council shall 
finance this study, including staff services for research and expenses 
of members of the committee and for clerical and office expenses, from 
appropriations made by the Legislature and from contributions from 
political subdivisions of state government and other public supported 
agencies. 
ADDENDUM E 
STATE OF UTAH 
Report and Recommendations of 
the Utah Legislative Council 
1963-1965 
PURSUANT TO TITLE 36, CHAPTER 4, SECTIONS 2 
AND 11, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
DECEMBER, 1964 
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the court in habitual truancy cases, clarification of the role of the pro-
bation officer, provision for some publicity in major delinquency cases, 
clarification of the general purpose statement, definitions of neglected 
and dependent child, qualifications of the probation staff, additional judge-
ship for the second district and appointive powers of the senior judge, also, 
designation of the chief probation officer and defining action where adults 
contribute to the delinquency of a juvenile. 
The Committee recommends the Juvenile Court Act as representing an 
effective, efficient, and conscientious effort on the part of well-qualified 
individuals who have worked to prepare a bill in the best interests of the 
State. 
Governmental Immunity 
The 1963 Legislature directed the Council "to study the effects upon 
states, their political subdivisions and municipal corporations of waiver 
of immunity from suit and consenting to be liable for the torts of its 
officers, employees, and agents as outlined in H.J.R. 21 of the 35th 
Legislature." (S.J.R. 14, item 2.) The Legislature considered this study 
of such importance that it separately appropriated the sum of $25,000 and 
directed the Council to appoint a committee with at least one-third of the 
membership from the legal profession. The Council appointed a committee of 
twenty-one members, with representation from the Legislature, the cities, 
counties, special taxing districts, school districts and other interests. 
Bills have previously been introduced in the Legislature to r.aive 
governmental immunity. In 1961 a bill was passed, then vetoed by the 
Governor and in 1963 a bill was introduced but failed to pass. 
Research activities include field investigations, gathering of data, 
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assimilation of information, formulation of proposals, drafting of legisla-
tion, and the preparation of a final report. Investigations of the claims 
experience of the State and its political subdivisions has been included in 
the Committee study. The extent of insurance coverage by governmental entities, 
the cost of such insurance and claims experience have been part of the study. 
Questionnaires were sent to other states in regard to tort claims and conse-
quential damage claims. The statutes of other states have been reviewed and 
catalogued. The Utah Code has been carefully examined, section by section. 
Case decisions have been studied. Conferences have been held with insurance 
personnel and rating information has been obtained from the National Bureau 
of Casualty Underwriters. Seven working drafts of legislation have been pre-
pared and studied by the staff, by Committee members, and by the Executive 
Committee. 
The Committee considered the important questions of whether governmental 
immunity from suit was important in the State and whether legislation was 
needed. 
Numerous citizens have been injured in their person and property by 
negligent acts of government employees and by the construction of public 
improvements. In many of these cases no recourse against the governmental 
entity has been possible. It was found that the present system works sub-
stantial injustice to citizens. There is a fear, however, among government 
officials, that to open the door to unrestrained claims would be too burden-
some upon governmental funds. 
The Committee concluded that immunity of governmental entities should 
be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or omissions 
of public employees. The Committee was not unanimous in its opinion regard-
ing responsibility for consequential damage. This latter type of claim is 
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for indirect or consequential damage resulting from the construction of pub-
lic improvements. It is not necessarily the result of any negligence but is 
merely the consequence of a particular government activity. 
The question of payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Committee. 
It was found that there is already a limited waiver of immunity in the State. 
For example, cities and towns can be sued and must respond in relation to de-
fective streets, sidewalks, culverts, and bridges. The State Road Commission 
has discretionary authority to pay individual claims up to $3,000 for injuries 
resulting from the negligence of its employees. The Fish and Game Commission 
must pay for crop damage resulting from wildlife. It was also found that 
83% of the political subdivisions responding to the survey already carry auto-
mobile insurance, and 30% of those carry comprehensive liability insurance. 
On the basis of the best experience available, it appears that vehicle 
insurance premiums and costs will show little increase should immunity be 
waived, but there may be an increase of as much as five to six times in the 
cost of general liability insurance. There would probably be more claims 
filed and some additional administrative costs incurred in handling these 
claims. 
There was unanimous approval by the committee members that governmental 
entities should be legally authorized to purchase liability insurance to pro-
tect both the entity and the employee. 
At the present time claims against the State are reviewed by the Board 
of Examiners and then passed on to the Legislature for its review and approp-
riation or refusal. If a state agency is not otherwise authorized by law to 
pay claims, then the authority of the Board of Examiners must be recognized 
and claims must be channelled through the Board. 
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The Committee has prepared a draft of legislation patterned after that 
adopted in California and in some other states. This legislation reaffirms 
the rule of governmental immunity, thus eliminating any confusion in the law, 
and then carves out specific exceptions where, as a matter of justice, immu-
nity from suit should be waived. No effort is made in the bill to create new 
or unique rules of substantive liability as far as governmental agencies are 
concerned. Where immunity is waived, liability or responsibility would then 
be determined by the courts. 
A second bill has been prepared which is simply an authorization for the 
permissive purchase of liability insurance. This latter bill does not waive 
immunity. It would solve the problem of immunity only insofar as the govern-
mental entity chooses to purchase liability insurance, thereby referring all 
claims to an insurance carrier. 
If the Legislature meets the question of governmental immunity head-on, 
it can consider the comprehensive draft which defines specific exceptions to 
immunity and also provides for insurance coverage. The second draft merely 
permits the purchase of insurance coverage by the governmental entities. 
The Committee recommends legislation to solve the problem of govern-
mental immunity. 
Justice of Peace 
A follow-up to the study made by a State Bar Committee prior to the 
1963 Legislature to determine the advisability of reforming the J. P. system 
was assigned to a committee of the Council. The Committee believes legisla-
tion is needed to accomplish the objectives of the assignment. The J. P. 
system is in need of reform and the Committee is preparing legislation to 
permit the establishment of "community courts.11 
ADDENDUM F 
Ch. 139 State Affairs [390] 
ing before the commission or before such member. 
(B) The commission is authorized to secure directly from any execu-
tive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent 
establishment or instrumentality, information suggestions, estimates and 
statistics for the purpose of this act and each such department, bureau, 
agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment or instru-
mentality is authorized and directed to furnish such information, sug-
gestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the commission upon re-
quest made by the chairman or vice-chairman. 
Section 12. Effective Date. 
This act shall take effect on March 25,1965. 
CHAPTER 139 
S. B. 4 (In Effect July 1, 1966) 
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY 
An Act Relating to the Immunity of the State, Its Agencies and Political 
Subdivision from Actions at Law; Providing for Exemption Thereto, 
for the Purchase of Liability Insurance, and for the Payment of Claims 
and Judgments. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act." 
Section 2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The word "state" shall mean the state of Utah or any office, 
department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hos-
pital, college, university or other instrumentality thereof; 
(2) The words "political subdivision" shall mean any county, city, 
town, school district, special improvement or taxing district, or any 
other political subdivision or public corporation; 
(3) The words "governmental entity" shall mean and include the 
state and its political subdivisions as defined herein; 
(4) The word "employee" shall mean and include any officer, em-
ployee or servant of a governmental entity; 
(5) The word "claim" shall mean any claim brought against a gov-
ernmental entity or its employee as permitted by this act; 
(6) The word "injury" means death, injury to a person, damage 
to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer 
to his person, or* estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private 
person or his agent. 
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Section 3. General Immunity in Exercise of Governmental Functions. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental 
entities shall be immune from suit for any injury which may re-
sult from the activities of said entities wherein said entity is en-
gaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. 
Section 4. Construction of Act—Consent to Suit Based on Waiver of 
Immunity. 
Nothing contained in this act, unless specially provided is to be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in-
sofar as governmental entities are concerned. Wherein immunity from 
suit is waived by this act, consent to be sued is granted and liability 
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
Section 5. Immunity Waived: Contractual Obligations. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any 
contractual obligation. 
Section 6. Immunity Waived: Property and Related Transactions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for' the 
recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession there-
of or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other' liens 
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure and ad-
judication touching any mortgage or other lien said entity may have 
or claim on the property involved. 
Section 7. Immunity Waived: Negligent Operation of Vehicle or 
Equipment by Agent—Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for in-
jury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a 
motor vehicle or other equipment while in the scope of his employ-
ment; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to the oper-
ation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven 
in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 1961. 
Section 8. Immunity Waived: Defective or Dangerous Conditions of 
Roads and Walks. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct or other structure located thereon. 
Section 9. Immunity Waived: Defective or Dangerous Conditions of 
Buildings and Other Structures. 
Immunity from suit of al- governmental entities is waived for any 
injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public 
Ch. 139 State Affairs [392] 
building, structure, dam, reservoir' or other public improvement. Im-
munity is not waived for latent defective conditions. 
Section 10. Immunity Waived: Negligent Injury—Exceptions: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for in-
jury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an em-
ployee committed within the scope of his employment except if the 
injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion 
is abused, or 
(2) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slan-
*^r. deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental an-
guish, invasion of rights of privacy, or civil rights, or 
(3) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, 
V>r by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or' revoke, any per-
mit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization, or 
(5) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or ad-
ministrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause, or 
(6) arises out of a misrepresentation by said employee whether 
or not such is negligent or intentional, or 
(7) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public 
(4) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of 
making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, or 
demonstrations, mob violence and civil disturbances, or 
(8) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and as-
sessment of taxes, or 
(9) arises out of the activities of the National Guard, or 
(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state 
prison, county or city jail or other place of legal confinement, or 
(11) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result 
of any activity by the state land board. 
Section 11. Appropriate Relief Authorized—Damages. 
Any person having a claim for injury to person or property against 
a governmental entity or its employee may petition said entity for 
any appropriate relief including the award of money damages. 
Section 12. One-Year Limitation on Actions Against State. 
A claim against the state or any agency thereof as defined herein 
shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attor-
ney general of the state of Utah and the agency concerned within one 
year after the cause of action arises. 
Section 13. Limitation on Actions Against Political Subdivisions—Law 
Governing Claims Against City or Incorporated Town. 
A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless 
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notice thereof is filed within ninety days after the cause of action 
arises; provided, however, that any claim against a city or incorporated 
town under Section 8 shall be governed by the provisions of Section 
10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Section 14. Approval of Claim Within 90 Days. 
Within 90 days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity 
or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in 
writing of its approval oi^  denial. A claim shall be deemed to have 
been denied if at the end of the 90-day period the governmental entity 
or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
Section 15. Action in Court Upon Denial—Action Within One Year. 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an a c t i o n in the 
district court against the governmental entity in those circumstances 
where immunity from suit has been wraived as in the act provided. 
Said action must be commenced within one year after denial or the 
denial period as specified herein. 
Section 16. Jurisdiction of District Courts—Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over 
any action brought under this act and such actions shall be governed 
by the Utah rules of civil procedure insofar as they are consistent 
with this act. 
Section 17. Venue of Actions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which 
the cause of action arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a 
county may be brought in the county in which the cause of action 
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a dis-
trict court judge of the defendant county, in any county contiguous 
to the defendant county. Said leave may be granted ex parte. Actions 
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall 
be brought in the county in which said political subdivision is located 
or in the county in which the cause of action arose. 
Section 18. Compromise and Settlement. 
The governmental entity, after conferring with its legal officer or 
other legal counsel if it has no such officer, may compromise anH 
settle any action as to the damages or other relief sought. 
Section 19. Plaintiffs Undertaking for Costs. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an under-
taking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less than the sum 
of $300, conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs 
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incurred by the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff fail" 
to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment. 
Section 20. Judgment Bars Further Action in Subject Matter. 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action brought under 
this act shall constitute a complete bar' to any action by the claimant. 
by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee whoso 
act or omission gave rise to the claim. 
Section 21. Bar of Claims by United States or Other State Under Act. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, no claim here-
under shall be brought by the United States or by any other state, 
territory, nation or governmental entity. 
Section 22. Punitive Damages Prohibited—Execution, Attachment, and 
Garnishment Barred Against State. 
No judgment shall be rendered against the governmental entity 
for exemplory or punitive damages; nor shall execution, attachment 
or garnishment issue against the governmental entity. 
Section 23. Payment of Claims and Judgments. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined herein or any final 
judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the office, 
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for payment 
if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If 
such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or claim shall 
be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed 
as provided in Section 63-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Section 24. Payment of Claims to Be Paid From General Funds. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judg-
ment obtained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to 
the governing body thereof to be paid forthwith from the general 
funds of said political subdivision unless said funds are appropriated 
to some other use or restricted by law or* contract for other pu:r s^. 
Section 25. Payment of Claim in Installments Authorized. 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the 
current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than 
ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or in such other install-
ments as are agreeable to the claimant. 
Section 26. Reserve Funds for Claims or Liability Insurance. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund 
or may jointly with one or more political subdivisions make contribu-
tions to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of 
claims against the cooperating subdivisions when they become pay-
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able pursuant to this act, or for the purpose of purchasing liability 
Insurance to protect the cooperating subdivisions fr'om any or all risks 
created by this act. 
Section 27. Authority of Political Subdivision to Levy Tax for Claims 
and Judgments. 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary all politi-
cal subdivisions shall have authority to levy an annual property tax 
in the amount necessary to pay any claims, settlements or judg-
ments secured pursuant to the provisions hereof, or to pay the costs 
to defend against same, or for the purpose of establishing and main-
taining a reserve fund for the payment of such claims, settlements or 
judgments as may be reasonably anticipated, or to pay the premium 
for such insurance as herein authorized, even though as a result of 
such levy the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded 
thereby; provided, that in no event shall such levy exceed Vz mill nor 
shall the revenues deilved therefrom be used for any other purpose than 
those stipulated herein. 
Section 28. Authority of Government Entities to Purchase Insurance. 
Any governmental entity within the state of Utah may purchase 
insurance against any risk which may arise as a result of the appli-
cation of this act. 
Section 29. Minimum Amounts of Insurance Purchased by Government 
Entities. 
Every policy ox" contract of insurance purchased by a governmental 
entity as permitted under the provisions of this chapter shall provide: 
(a) In respect to bodily injury liability that the insurance carrier 
shall pay on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums which the 
insured would in the absence of the defense of governmental immunity 
be legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, sustained by any 
person, caused by accident, and arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance and use of automobiles, or arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of premises, and all operations necessary or incidental 
thereto, or* in respect to other operations and caused by accident sub-
ject to a limit, exclusive of interest and costs, of not less than $100,000 
because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident 
and, subject to said limit for one person, to a limit of not less than 
$300,000 because of bodily injury or death of two or more persons in 
any one accident. 
(b) In respect to property damage liability that the insurance car-
rier shall pay on behalf of the insured governmental entity all sums 
which the insured would in the absence of the defense of governmental 
immunity be legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to 
or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by 
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of 
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automobiles, or arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of 
premises, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto, or in re-
spect to other operations and caused by accident to a limit of not less 
than $50,000 because of injury to or destruction of property of others 
in any one accident. 
Section 30. Insurer to Agree Not to Assert Defense of Sovereign Im-
munity. 
Every contract or policy of insurance purchased under the terms 
of this act for any or all risks created by this act shall include a pro-
vision or endorsement by which the insurer agrees not to assert the 
defense of sovereign immunity, and to pay all sums for which it would 
otherwise be liable under its contract or policy of insurance. 
Section 31. Severable Validity of Insurance Contracts. 
Any insurance policy, aider or endorsement hereafter issued and 
purchased to insure against any risk which may arise as a result 
of the application of this act, which contains any condition cr pro-
vision not in compliance with the requirements of the act, shall not 
be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied in ac-
cordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had 
such policy, rider or endorsement been in full compliance with this act, 
provided the policy is otherwise valid. 
Section 32. Insurance to Be Subject to Public Bid. 
No contract or policy of insurance may be purchased under this 
chapter or renewed under this act except upon public bid to be let 
to the lowest and best bidder. 
Section 33. Authority of Government Entity to Insure Against Negli-
gence of Agents. 
A governmental entity may insure any or' all of its employees 
against all or any part of his liability for injury or damage result-
ing from a negligent act or omission in the scope of his employment 
regardless of whether or not said entity is immune from suit for said 
act or omission, and any expenditure for such insurance is herewith 
declared to be for a public purpose. 
Section 34. Judgment in Excess of Minimum Amounts. 
If any judgment or award against a governmental entity under 
Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of this act exceeds the minimum amounts 
for bodily injury and property damage liability specified in Sec-
tion 29 of this act, the court shall reduce the amount of said judg-
ment or award to a sum equal to said minimum requirements unless the 
governmental entity has secured insurance coverage in excess of said 
minimum requirements in which event the court shall reduce the amount 
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of said judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits pro-
vided in the insurance policy. 
Section 35. Severability Clause. 
If any section, part or parts of this act shall be held to be uncon-
stitutional, such unconstitutionality shall not affect the validity of 
the remainder of this act. 
Section 36. Conflicting Statutes Repealed. 
All other acts or statutes in conflict with provisions of this act 
are repealed as of the effective date of this act. 
Section 37. Effective Date. 
This act shall take effect on July 1,- 1966, and shall apply only to 
claims and actions arising after said date. 
CHAPTER 140 
H. B. 15 (In Effect May 11, 196o) 
STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION—POWERS 
An Act Amending Section 64-4-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to Provide 
That Moneys Received From Conversion of Real and Personal Property 
by the Utah State Fair Association, and Paid Into the State Treasury 
and Placed to the Credit of the State Fair Association Maintenance 
Fund, Shall Not Lapse at the End of a Biennium but be Continued on 
Into the Next Biennium: and Section 64-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, to Provide That Moneys Received From Leasing of the Asso-
ciation's Property and Paid Into the State Treasury and Placed to the 
Credit of the State Fair Association Maintenance Fund, Shall Not 
Lapse at the End of a Biennium, But Be Continued Into the Next 
Biennium: and Enacting a New Section to Be Known as Section 64-4-11, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Providing That the State Fair Association 
Maintenance Fund Shall Be a Continuing Fund and Not Revert to the 
General Fund of the State at the End of Any Biennium. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 64-4-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
64-4-1. Powers of Utah State Fair Association—State Fair Association 
Maintenance Fund a Continuing Fund—Exemption From Taxes. 
The Utah State Fair Association is continued a body corporate with 
